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I. INTRODUCTION 
"Big Mountain" is the popular name given to the controversy arising out of the 
passage of Pub. L. No. 93-531, which mandates the removal of Native Americans, 
specifically the Hopi and the Navajo, from a portion of their traditional homeland.' For 
nearly a century, the Hopi and Navajo have jointly occupied a portion of the 1882 
Executive Order Reservation known as the Joint Use Area (JUA). The JUA is believed 
to have the largest and most accessible deposits of low sulphur coal in North America. 2 
Development of the JUA, however, is not popular among the majority of Hopi and 
* The author would especially like to thank Ward Churchill from the International Indian 
Treaty Council for his encouragement and helpful suggestions on earlier drafts. The author is also 
indebted to Sandy Schwayder, Ved P. Nanda, Richard Clemmer-Smith, Lucy Hawley, Paul Bloom, 
Willam Crazy-Horse Coppola, Rich Garcia, Judith Rhedin, and others who contributed to the 
University of Denver Human Rights Clinic Big Mountain project, and facilitated the completion of 
this article. 
I Pub. L. No. 93-531 (1974); (codified as amended in 25 U.S.C. §§ 640 to 640d-28 (1982)). 
2 P. LEE, NAVAJOS RESIST FORCED RELOCATION 8 (1985)(available from the Big Mountain Sup-
port Group, 1412 Cypress St., Berkeley, CA 94703). See also J. KAMMER, THE SECOND LONG WALK: 
THE NAVAJO-HoPI LAND DISPUTE (1980). 
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Navajo. Within each tribe there is an internal conflict of cultural values between the 
traditionals and the non-traditionals. The traditionals are those Indians who have main-
tained traditional cultural values, notably their religious bond with the land.3 The non-
traditionals are those tribe members who have assimilated into contemporary society and 
are generally pro-development.4 The non-traditionals, however, control the tribal coun-
cils, the official Indian government recognized by the U.S. government. Generally, the 
tribal councils are not supported by the traditionals, and therefore are not representative 
of the tribe as a whole.5 Thus, the land dispute which created the perceived need for 
Pub. L. No. 93-531 does not involve a conflict between the Hopi and Navajo tribes. 
Instead, the dispute involves a conflict between the pro-development Hopi Tribal Council 
and the traditional Hopi and Navajo because development of the JUA is contrary to the 
traditionals' spiritual or religious beliefs.6 
Pub. L. No. 93-531 mandates a relocation of Hopi and Navajo living in the JUA to 
result in an equal division of the JUA creating a Hopi sector and a Navajo sector.7 The 
burdens of a division of the JUA fall disproportionately on the Navajo because the 
Navajo continue to live in their traditional ways dispersed throughout the JUA. The 
majority of traditional and non-traditional Hopi continue to live in the Hopi pueblo 
villages which are not affected by the relocation.8 Only a minority of Hopi who have 
adopted non-traditional ways and moved out of the pueblos will benefit from Pub. L. 
No. 93-531. Most importantly, the final effect of the relocation will be to free for 
development the energy rich land once shared by the Hopi and Navajo.9 
Essentially, the impetus for the passage of Pub. L. No. 93-531 was a wholly fictitious 
event, dubbed the "Hopi-Navajo Range War." The "war" was the creation of an adver-
tising agency hired by the Hopi Tribal Council to secure passage of a bill that would 
divide the JUA.lO Obviously the goal of the "war" was for the U.S. government to infer 
3 For additional discussion see infra notes 36-39 and accompanying text. 
4 Many of the Hopi non-traditionals have adopted the Mormon faith. R. CLEMMER-SMITH, 
CONTINUITIES OF HOPI CULTURAL CHANGE 7 (1978). 
5 For additional discussion see infra notes 41-48 and accompanying text. 
6 Development is not a new concept to either the Hopi or Navajo Tribal Councils. The only 
functioning coal facility in the Black Mesa Region was the product of a 1966 agreement primarily 
developed by attorney John Boyden and his clients, the Hopi Tribal Council and the Peabody Coal 
Co., of which the Mormon Church is a large stockholder. KAMMER, supra note 2 at 78, 79. See also 
Churchill, Navajos: No Home on the Range, 21 THE OTHER SIDE 22, 25 (Jan.lFeb. 1985). Similarly, 
the Navajos joined the Kayenta coal lease in 1967, one year after the Hopi Tribal Council had 
reached an agreement with Peabody Coal Co. KAMMER, supra note 2, at 78. 
7 See infra notes 65-67 and accompanying text. 
8 A.D. Brugge, Navajo Prehistory and History to 1850, in 10 HAND BOOK OF NORTH AMERICAN 
INDIANS 489, 490 (A. Ortiz ed. 1983). The JUA is the part of the 1882 Hopi reservation set aside 
for both Hopi and Navajo use. 
9 The major interests supporting the passage of Pub. L. No. 93-531 become clear when the 
"Hopi" side of the JUA is considered: I} The Hopi Tribal Council will profit from the development 
of the JUA; 2} John Boyden, a Bishop in the Mormon Church, will benefit himself and his church 
through the profits of the Peabody Coal Co.; and 3} Dana Evans and Assoc., an advertising agency 
which represented WESCO, a consortium of 23 energy companies interested in developing the 
Black Mesa Region, will also profit. KAMMER, supra note 2, at 162, 122, 136. See also Churchill, 
Resisting Relocation - Hopis Fight to Keep Their Land, 112 DOLLARS AND SENSE 14 (Dec. 1985). For an 
extensive discussion on how the energy link fits into the traditional's survival at Big Mountain, see 
Sills, Relocation Reconsidered: Competing Explanation of the Navajo-Hopi Land Settlement Act of 1947, 
14(3} J. ETHNIC STUD. 53 (1986). 
10 KAMMER, supra note 2, at 89 (1980). The "Range War" was the product of Dana Evans and 
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an inter-tribal battle which necessitated segregating the Hopi and Navajo within the JUA 
in order to end the range war. The true purpose behind the "war" was to enact legislation 
that would clear title to the land and grant the right to remove the people residing there 
in order to free the land for development. II In reality, no dispute existed between the 
Hopi and Navajo that could have rationalized the passage of Pub. L. No. 93-531. 12 Yet 
the press continues to report the situation as a land dispute between the two tribes. I3 
This is misleading and only serves to obscure the complex issues. I4 
However the underlying issue is framed, Pub. L. No. 93-531 will result in the largest 
removal of an ethnic group from their homes since the Japanese-American incarceration 
during World War 11,15 and the largest removal of Native Americans since the "Long 
Walk."16 Two factors make the situation at Big Mountain unique. First, while the removal 
of Native Americans from their traditional homeland is unfortunately not an historical 
anomaly, forced relocation has not been a part of official U.S. policy for nearly a 
century.I7 Second, the Big Mountain relocation is occurring after the emergence of 
Native American activism and the reemergence of the concept of tribal sovereignty. IS 
Assoc., a Salt Lake City advertising agency under the direction of the Hopi Tribal Council and 
Abbott Sekaquaptewa, a leader of the non-traditional Indians in control of the Hopi Tribal Council 
at that time. 
II For additional discussion on the effect of the Navajo-Hopi Range War, see Mander, Kit Carson 
in a Three-Piece Suit, 32 CO-EVOLUTION Q. 52 (Wtr 1981). 
12Id. 
13 See, Rocky Mtn. News, June 16, 1986, at 20, col. 1; Denver Post, Jan. 4, 1987, at 6E, col. 1. 
A notable exception to the typical coverage is the work of John Farrell on the human rights 
violations against Native Americans reported in an eight-part series, which discusses the Big Moun-
tain situation in a human rights context. See, Denver Post, Nov. 20-27, 1983 at Emp. 11, col. 2; at 
Bl, col. 1; at AI, col. 1; at AI, col. 1; at AI, col. 1; at AI, col. 1; at AI, col. 4; at Emp. 11, col. 2. 
14 Coverage of the common purpose and cooperation between traditionals of the tribes has 
been limited to the specialized press. For example, see The Guardian, June 18, 1986, at 9, col. 2, 
for a report that traditionals of both tribes will be holding a "hands across the fence" action on July 
7, 1986 to show their solidarity in opposition to Pub. L. No. 93-531. 
15 Whitson, A Policy Review of the Federal Government's Relocation of Navajo Indians Under Pub. L. 
No. 93-531 and Pub. L. No. 93-305, 27 ARIZ. L. REv. 371, 373 (1985). On February 19, 1942 
President Roosevelt signed Exec. Order No. 9066, which resulted in the internment of 120,000 
persons of Japanese ancestry. See also Blodgett,justice at Last? 72 ABA J. 24 (July 1, 1986) for a 
discussion of the current legal ramifications concerning the Japanese-Americans who were tempo-
rarily relocated during World War II. 
16 In 1853, the U.S. Army lead by Kit Carson rounded up over 8,000 Navajos and marched 
them to a concentration camp in northern New Mexico. Many Navajos died during the march and 
during their incarceration. See Matthiessen, Battle for Big Mountain, 2 GEO. 9, 23 (March 1980). The 
exact number of Native Americans that will be forced to relocate under Pub. L. No. 93-531 is 
uncertain. The federal government claims that 9,525 Navajos and 109 Hopis will be forced to 
relocate. See Navajo-Hopi Indian Relocation Commission (NHIRC), 1981 Rep. and Plan 3 (April 1981). 
However, an attorney working with the Big Mountain Legal Offense/Defense Committee estimates 
the number of affected Native Americans at 12,000-15,000. Phillips, Last Stand at Big Mountain, 9 
GUILD NOTES 6 (1985). 
17 Previous forced relocations of this magnitude occurred in the 19th century (e.g. the trail of 
tears and the long walk). See generally C.E. TRAFZER, THE KIT CARSON CAMPAIGN: THE LAST GREAT 
NAVAJO WAR (1980). 
18 The American Indian Movement and its affiliate groups have raised the consciousness of the 
tribes and the world community to the level where the idea of tribal sovereignty is regaining 
acceptance in the Indian and international communities. See V. DELORIA & C. LYTLE, THE NATIONS 
WITHIN, THE PAST AND FUTURE OF AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY (1984). 
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This article presents an overview of the international human rights implications of 
the Big Mountain relocation. 19 This article will discuss the status ofthe American Indian 
in international and domestic law through an analysis of the Big Mountain situation. In 
addition to the analysis of human rights violations, this article will evaluate the courses 
of action which are available to redress the human rights violations, and the likelihood 
of their success. The article concludes with suggested policy changes. 
II. THE BIG MOUNTAIN DISPUTE 
A. A Historical and Social Perspective 
The Hopi and Navajo have inhabited what is now the southwestern United States 
for centuries.20 The first contact the tribes had with foreigners was with the Spanish 
missionaries and settlers.21 From that time, the culture and way of life of the Native 
Americans has been influenced by European values.22 Most Europeans believed that 
their values were the civilized ways; that it would be best for them to show the savages 
the way to civilization by forcing their way of life on the Indians.23 Old Tassel, the famous 
Cherokee leader of the eighteenth century, remarked on the continuous demand by the 
settlers that the Cherokees accept the European civilization as their own: 
Much has been said of the want of what you term "civilization" among the 
Indians. Many proposals have been made to us to adopt your laws, your 
religion, your manner and your customs. We do not see the propriety of 
such a reformation. We should be better pleased with beholding the good 
effects of these doctrines in your own practices than with hearing you talk 
about them .... 24 
The Hopi and the Navajo rejected foreign values and resisted Western culture in 
different ways.25 The Hopi resistance was peaceful non-cooperation.26 The Navajo fought 
back, and were brutally brought into submission by military force. 27 What the settlers 
could not understand, and what many Americans have yet to understand, is that the 
19 For additional discussion on the human rights violations caused by Pub. L. No. 93-531 see 
Churchill, Examination and Analysis of the Implications of u.s. Policy Within the Navajo-Hopi joint Use 
Area Under Provisions of International Law, 17(3,4) AKWESASNE NOTES 8 (1985); Development, Human 
Rights Violations by the U.S. Government Against Native Americans in the Passage and Enforcement of Pub. 
L. No. 93-531, 15 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'y (1987). 
20 The Hopis are descendants of the Anasazi who inhabited the Southwest from about 7000 to 
200 B.C. See D.G. NOBLE, ANCIENT RUINS OF'THE SOUTHWEST 25 (1981). The Hopis have inhabited 
the Black Mesa region since about 600 A.D. The Navajos entered the Southwest between 1000 and 
1525 A.D. Contact between the Hopi and Navajo, is evidenced by the fact that the Navajos in the 
region closest to the Hopis had more developed agricultural skills than their counterparts. Spanish 
records show trade between the Hopi and Navajo dating 1582-1583, 1630, 1634. See Brugge, supra 
note 8. 
21 See Brugge, supra note 8. 
22 CLEMMER-SMITH, supra note 4, at 78. 
23 Indian Law Resource Center, United States Denial of Indian Property Rights: A Study in Lawless 
Power and Racial Discrimination, in RETHINKING INDIAN LAW, 20 (1982). 
24 Quoted in V. DELORIA, GOD IS RED 206 (1975). 
25 Mander, supra note II, at 57. 
26Id. 
27 For example, the "long walk" was the result of the Navajo resistance. See TRAFZER, supra note 
17; Matthiessen, supra note 16. 
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Native Americans could critically analyze the European culture.28 Most Indians consid-
ered the settlers' values, but rejected them as different and undesirable.29 
. Before contact with the settlers, the Native Americans had a non-market, self-
sufficient economy.50 As the Indians were exposed to Western culture the level of 
economic self-sufficiency declined. Eventually, the relationship between Native American 
people and the United States became one similar to a colony and colonizer.51 Accordingly, 
in 1934 the federal government passed the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) which 
mandated that the tribes create a form of government similar to that of the United 
States. The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) was created to assist the tribes in writing 
their- new constitution, setting up elections, and tribal council governments. 52 The orig-
inal concept of John Collier, the head of the BIA when the IRA was passed, was to mesh 
traditional tribal governments with the new system. 53 The tribes which chose to organize 
under the IRA have found that cooperation did not occur. The federally supported 
tribal councils wield the majority of the power on the reservations and at times completely 
disregard the traditional institutions that had previously performed governmental func-
tions.54 The BIA installed tribal council became the official and only legal entity the U.S. 
government would recognize. 55 
Unfortunately, the U.S. government did not recognize that the tribal council was 
supported by a minority of Native Americans who had abandoned their traditional 
beliefs and assimilated into contemporary culture. Indians supporting the tribal councils 
are known as the non-traditionals. The majority of Indians known as the traditionals 
still subscribe to their belief in the religious nature of land. To most traditional Native 
Americans, there is a special bond between themselves, the earth, and nature.56 The 
28 CLEMMER-SMITH, supra note 4, at 78. 
29 For example, see the Indian written, Proposed Standards: Draft Declarations of Principles for the 
Defence of the Indigenous Nations and Peoples of the Western Hemisphere, reprinted in RETHINKING INDIAN 
LAw 137 (1982). See also Indians are Outcasts in their Own Land, Rocky Mtn News, June 24, 1986, at 
33 for a recent letter to the editor by Joe Standing Buffalo, which illustrates the Indian's frustration 
and indignation for American society and values: 
The American Indian population has been estimated at 13 million at the time of 
Columbus' arrival in the continental United States. It was murder[edl into near .ex-
tinction at 250,000 in 1890. Our population has never replaced itself. Entire tribes 
have ceased to exist .... As I see it, the native population was living in a garden of 
Eden as described in Genesis of your Bible. Revelations describes this great glittering 
beautiful heinous beast that devours, murders, steals, cheats and deceives, and says 
those who don't worship its ways will be killed. From what I can see, this beast is the great 
American civilized society. 
so CLEMMER-SMITH, supra note 4, at 19. 
" See STAVENHAGEN, BETWEEN UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND REVOLUTION - A LATIN AMERICAN 
PERSPECTIVE 32 (1981). 
S2 Coulter, A History of Indian jurisdiction, in RETHINKING INDIAN LAw 12 (1982). 
ss See generally DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 18. 
M V. DELORIA, BEHIND THE TRAIL OF BROKEN TREATIES: AN INDIAN DECLARATION OF INDEPEN-
·DENCE 200 (1974). . 
S5 For an account of the U.S. Supreme Court's dismissal of a suit between traditional Hopis 
and the Tribal Council see CLEMMER-SMITH, supra note 4, at 9. 
S6Id. at 41. See also Whitson, supra note 15, at 387 (quoting Askie Betsie, a traditional Navajo 
woman:) 
The White Man does not understand that the Indian is bonded to their land and 
cannot be treated as parcels to be distributed like the U.S. mail. The chaos has a 
tremendous psychological effect on the Nav<tio people and their descendants because 
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bond between man and earth is embodied in a religion that encompasses every aspect 
of Native Americans' lives and their relationship with all they encounter. For example, 
Young Chief, a Cayuse Indian, believed in the unity of creation. He believed that he 
could not sign a treaty, because the rest of creation that would be affected by the treaty 
was not represented in the transaction: 
I wonder if the ground has anything to say? I wonder if the ground is 
listening to what is said? ... The ground says, the Great Spirit placed me 
here to produce all that grows on me, trees and fruit. It was from me that 
man was made. The Great Spirit, in placing men on earth, desired them to 
take good care of the ground and to do each other no harm. 57 
In addition, for most traditionals material wealth is meaningless. 
Being is a spiritual proposition. Gaining is a material act. Traditionally, 
American Indians have attempted to be the best people they could. Part of 
that spiritual process is to give away wealth, to discard wealth in order not 
to gain. Material gain is an indication of false status among traditionalist 
people while it is "proof that the system works" to Europeans. Clearly, there 
are two completely opposing views here .... 38 
Thus, the struggle at Big Mountain against relocation is carried out by traditional Native 
Americans, both Hopi and Navajo, because they understand the significance of the land 
to their lives, and fear that the property freed by the relocation will be developed: "We 
know that our old people have warned us against white men who are only looking for 
material things .... We oppose this coal lease because it violates our Hopi belief .... 
We don't want the money - we want our land."39 This viewpoint, endorsed by the 
traditionals, is diametrically opposed to the neglect of the land by non-Indian peoples 
and those Indians who no longer respect the earth religiously.40 
The Hopi Tribal Council is exemplary of the IRA's effect and is a crucial element 
in the Big Mountain situation. The Hopi Tribal Council was created in 1936 even though 
71 % of the Hopi eligible to vote demonstrated their disapproval of the Council by 
each is part of the whole and not separable in any situation. According to Navajo 
culture and tradition, the only time we leave a member physically is when we die, but 
we would still be bound to them spiritually because their spirit remains within our 
land. 
'7 See DELORIA, supra note 24, at 2, 95. 
'8 Means, The Same Old Song, in MARXISM AND NATIVE AMERICANS 21, 22 (W. Churchill ed. 
1983). 
'9 Statements of Thomas Banyacya and Mina Lansa addressing the Senate Subcommittee on 
Administrative Practices and Procedures. Quoted in Traditional Hopi Speak for Themselves, 13 CLEAR 
CREEK 40 (May 1972). 
40 See DELORIA, supra note 24, at 2, 67. Some critics question the Navajo's religious regard for 
their land by pointing to the traditional Navajo's herding and overgrazing as evidence of their 
abuse of the earth. This argument fails to consider that overgrazing occurs because property division 
and constricted use has been imposed on the Navajos. The traditional Navajo have been limited to 
a piece of land, they are aware of the overgrazing and the problems it creates, but they are forced 
to overgraze because of a lack of alternatives. See Paul & Dias, Developing Human Rights for Human-
Needs-Centered Development, (1985)(available from the International Center for Law Development, 
777 United Nations Plaza, New York, NY 10017). 
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boycotting the election.4l The Hopi Tribal Council collapsed between 1943-1952, and 
the traditional leaders resumed their official roles.42 In the late 1940's, minerals were 
discovered near the Indian reservations, but the traditional leaders were unwilling to 
exploit those minerals.4s In 1952, with the help of John Boyden, who later became the 
attorney for both the Peabody Coal Co. and the Hopi Tribal Council," the official Tribal 
Council was revived.45 The 1952 election and all subsequent elections were boycotted by 
the majority of Hopi.46 The Hopi refused to vote in the election because they believed 
voting would legitimize a system they did not accept.47 The traditional Hopi have con-
tinually sent letters to Washington informing the federal government that the Hopi did 
not accept the Tribal Council as their representatives, thus asserting their belief that the 
Hopi Nation was a sovereign nation not subjugated by the United States.4S The IRA's 
tribal councils are of vital importance because the Hopi Tribal Council is a mcyor force 
supporting the Big Mountain relocation, and has greatly influenced the laws defining 
and establishing the boundaries of the Navajo and Hopi reservations. 
B. The Reservations 
Although the Navajo lived primarily in northwest New Mexico and northeast Ari-
zona prior to the Kit Carson campaign, the first Navajo reservation encompassed only a 
small part of northwest New Mexico.49 Although in 1878, 1880, and 1884, more land 
was added to the Navajo reservation, it still did not include all the land that the Navcyo 
previously controlled.5O In 1882 the first Hopi reservation was created by an Executive 
Order of President Arthur, which reserved a section of northeastern Arizona "for the 
use and occupancy of the [Hopi] and such other Indians as the Secretary of the Interior 
may see fit to settle thereon."5l Like the Navcyo reservation, the Hopi reservation did 
41 Whitson, supra note 15, at 376. See also CLEMMER-SMITH, supra note 4, at 11. These articles 
discuss numerous studies which indicate that many Native Americans, like the Hopi, used the 
boycott to show disapproval. The studies also have shown that although the sociologists and an-
thropologists working for the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) were aware of those customs, the 
BIA ignored this information. 
42 Berkey, Coulter & Tullberg, Violations of the Human Rights of the Hopi People by the United States 
of America, in RETHINKING INDIAN LAw 161 (1982). 
43 Id. 
44 There have been articles written about the connection between John Boyden and Peabody 
Coal Co. in recreating the Hopi Tribal Council. Both Boyden and Peabody profited extensively 
from the subsequent coal leases worked out with the Tribal Council. The uncomfortable connection 
could be construed as a violation of the attorney's Code of Ethics and Professional Responsibility 
because the code prohibits an attorney to work for two entities when a possible conflict of interest 
could occur. See ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, rules: 1.6, 1.7, 1.8, 1.9,3.5,4.1, 
4.4. For a complete discussion of the "Boyden" connection see Mander supra note 11; McLeod, This 
lAnd is Sacred ... It is not for uasing or Sale, High Country News, May 12, 1987, at 7. 
45 Berkey, Coulter & Tullberg, supra note 42, at 163 . 
... Id.; See also Whitson, supra note 15, at 376. 
47 CLEMMER-SMITH, supra note 4, at 40. Traditionally the Hopis did not act by majority vote, 
but would discuss an issue or decision until arriving at a consensus decision. 4. See Berkey, Coulter & Tullberg, supra note 42, at. 163. 
49 TRAFZER, supra note 17. at 240. 
50 Phillips, supra note 16. 
51 Executive Order dated December 16, 1882, reprinted in Healing v. Jones, 210 F. Supp. 125, 
129 (D. Ariz. 1962) aft'd, 373 U.S. 758 (l963)(per curiam). 
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not reflect the previous lands occupied by the Hopi people.52 The 1882 Executive Order 
area was a precise rectangle, exactly one degree longitude by one degree latitude, which 
left an entire Hopi village outside its boundary while encompassing a large number of 
Navajo who lived near the Hopi mesas. 55 Eventually the Navajo reservation grew to 
encompass the 1882 executive area,54 resulting in a situation where some Hopi live on 
land set aside by the federal government for the Navajo, and some Navajo live on land 
set aside for the Hopi.55 
In 1943, an area called District 6, which was a part of the 1882 reservation previously 
set aside for exclusive Hopi use, was expanded to include the Hopi residing in the 1882 
area. 56 This, however, left a sizeable portion of the 1882 reservation open for continued 
mixed use. This portion of the reservation became known as the "mixed use" area. At 
that time, the Navajo who lived in the mixed use area of the 1882 reservation were 
considered to hold rights that were coextensive with the rights of the Hopi.57 Caselaw 
and legislation have attempted to clarify whether the 1882 Executive Order actually 
intended the Navajo and Hopi to have equal rights on the reservation. 58 
In 1958, Congress passed Pub. L. No. 85-547, which authorized the two Tribal 
Councils to participate in a lawsuit which would officially determine the interest and 
rights to the 1882 Executive Order area. 59 In Healing v. Jones,60 the court reaffirmed the 
Hopi's exclusive rights to the District 6 area, and awarded the remainder of the 1882 
area to both the Hopi and Navajo. That area became known as the Joint Use Area (JUA) 
where "[t]he Hopi and Navajo Tribes have joint, undivided, and equal interests as to 
the surface and sub-surface including all resources appertaining thereto, subject to the 
trust title of the United States."6l This decision cleared title to the land, but made the 
JUA area almost impossible to "develop" because of the ideological differences between 
the Hopi and Navajo Tribal Councils.62 The pro-development Hopi Tribal Council was 
unsatisfied with this decision, and took action to free the land for development. 
52 Interview with Richard Clemmer-Smith, anthropologist in Denver, CO. (June 20, 1986) 
[hereinafter Clemmer-Smith interview]. 
55 KAMMER, supra note 2, at 28. 
M Whitson, supra note 15, at 414. 
55 [d. at 381. The current relocation could establish bad precedent because those Hopis who 
live and have always lived in Moenkopi, are now living in an area set aside by the federal government 
for the Navajo reservation. 
56 Shifter & West, Healing v. Jones: A Mandate for Another Trail of Tears1, 51 N.D.L. REv. 73 
(1974). 
57 On June 11, 1946, Felix S. Cohen, Acting Solicitor, issued a memorandum to the Secretary 
of the Interior concerning the ownership of mineral rights in the Hopi Executive Order reservation. 
He concluded that the rights were coextensive for all those Navajos that had setded in the area 
prior to October 24, 1936. 
58 See Whitson, supra note 15. 
59 72 Stat. 403 (1958). See also Whitson, supra note 15, at 376. 
60 210 F. Supp. 125 (D. Ariz. 1962), afl'd, 373 U.S. 758 (1963)(per curiam). An earlier Healing 
v. Jones, 174 F. Supp. 211 (D. Ariz. 1959), afl'd, 373 U.S. 758 (1963)(per curiam) determined 
whether Congress under its "plenary authority" could consider the issue. The Court decided that 
the district court had the authority to delineate the rights because the Indians had an equitable 
interest in the 1882 area. 
61 [d. See also Whitson, supra note 15, at 377. 
62 CLEMMER-SMITH, supra note 4, at 18. 
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The first success for the Hopi Tribal Council was the Hamilton v. Nakai decision.63 
The Hamilton Court interpreted Healing v. Jones to mean that half the surface area of 
the JUA was to be reserved for the Hopi. The Hamilton decision reduced Navajo livestock 
on the JUA by 85% and created a moratorium on new construction that did not have a 
permit issued by both Tribal Councils. In 1974, the passage of Pub. L. No. 93-531 
marked the second success for the Hopi Tribal Council.64 Essentially, Pub. L. No. 93-
531 mandates a 50-50 division of the surface area of the JU A between the Hopi and 
Navajo, with the Tribal Councils maintaining joint interest in the subsurface of the 
JUA.65 The deadline for implementation of the Act was set for July 6, 1986. On that 
date, the Hopi and Navajo were to be relocated to their appointed sides ofthe partition.66 
In addition, the Act mandated a further livestock reduction plan for the area, which 
made it impossible for many of the traditionals to subsist on the land.67 The Act also 
established the Navajo-Hopi Indian Relocation Commission (NHIRC) to implement the 
Act's provisions.68 While not everyone who will be forced to move will receive government 
assistance, the NHIRC must provide moving expenses, compensation for the old home, 
and a new safe and sanitary dwelling to those who qualify.69 The Act also allows the 
NHIRC to provide monetary incentives to induce the Indians to "voluntarily relocate."70 
Generally, the NHIRC has been ineffective. The program's costs have skyrocketed, 
and the NHIRC has not met its July 6,1986 relocation deadline.71 The NHIRC originally 
projected its annual costs at $500,000, but expenses are expected to reach two billion 
dollars.72 These cost overruns can be attributed to the Indian's unwillingness to move,73 
and the inability of the government to keep its commitments under the Act. 74 
For the traditionals, the relocation represents a destruction of their homeland and 
spiritual lifestyle. Navajos are being forced to move from their spiritual center. Both 
traditional Navajo and Hopi have special religious attachment to the earth which may 
eventually be disturbed by strip mining associated with the development of the region.75 
6S 538 F.2d 1230 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 945 (1976). 
64 88 Stat. 1714 (1974), amended by Pub. L. No. 96-305, 94 Stat. 930 (1980) (codified at 25 U.S.C. 
§§ 640d to 640d-28 (1983)). It should also be noted that the Hopi Tribal Council's lobbying efforts 
had been constant since the Healing v. Jones decision. In fact, the first partition bill was introduced 
in 1963. See CLEMMER-SMITH, supra note 4, at 8. 




69 Id.; See also Whitson, supra note 15, at 379. The Relocation Act lists the requirements needed 
to qualify for assistance. See supra note 64. 
7°Id. 
71 Big Mountain Notes, Sum. 1986, at 5, col. 1, (available from BoulderlDenver Big Mountain 
Support Groups, P.O. Box # 1867, Denver, CO 80218). 
72Id. Thus far there has not been an investigation for Congressional committee oversight. See 
McLeod, Navajo-Hopi Land Dispute-Navajos Resist Relocation, High Country News, May 12, 1986, at 
6. 
7S By 1980, only 20% of the Indians had relocated voluntarily. See Mander, supra note 11, at 
53. 
7. Whitson, supra note 15, at 409. The government is mandated to remove all Indians by July 
6, 1986, but will be unable to assist all eligible "relocatees" until 1993. 
75 Matthiessen, supra note 16, at 26. It should be noted that most Hopis affected by the relocation 
are non-traditionals, who do not feel any special attachment to a certain parcel of land. Therefore, 
they have voluntarily cooperated in the relocation. 
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The traditional Navajo who are dependent on herding have been forced to give up their 
only means to self-sufficiency because they are generally relocated to neighboring towns 
where herding is impossible.76 Lacking skills, the Indians become dependent on welfare.77 
One third of those relocated have already lost their government-provided housing.78 
These effects, in turn, have produced a high rate of alcoholism79 and suicide among the 
Indians.80 Most importantly, the depressed economic and social conditions which char-
acterize the Indian reservations warrant increased attention to the Big Mountain relo-
cation because the traditional Hopi and Navajo affected by Pub. L. No. 93-531 may be 
the largest group of self-sufficient Indians left in the United States.81 However, the fate 
of most Native Americans is similar to the Navajo: 
On paper, the Navajo should be one of the wealthiest peoples on the earth. 
In fact, ... the average per capita income is about $1,300 a year, largely 
because of the ludicrous terms of the leases signed on behalf of the Navajo 
by the Tribal Council, with the encouragement and approval by the Bureau 
of Indian Affairs.82 
Accordingly, the Navajo reservation was characterized in 1975 by the United States 
Commission on Civil Rights as an "American Colony" with problems endemic to pov-
erty.83 Scholars have placed blame on the difficulties of a forced transition of values and 
the exploitation of the Native Americans.84 Their lives have been severely impacted by 
the quest for economic growth and mineral exploration. The Native Americans have 
been forced into an economic situation under which their self-sufficient ways were 
destroyed to the point that their economy must be supported by the government.85 
C. Current Legal Actions 
In 1980 Congress passed compromise legislation, Pub. L. No. 96-305, which 
amended Pub. L. No. 93-531.86 The amendment involved two major provisions. First, 
anyone over the age of 49 in 1974, who was living on the "wrong side" of the JUA, was 
entitled to a 120 acre life estate. Second, the amendment mandated the transfer of 
250,000 acres under the administration of the Bureau of Land Management and the 
purchase by the Navajo tribe of an additional 150,000 acres.87 The amendment did not 
address the root of the problems involved in Pub. L. No. 93-531, and other members of 
76 Shifter & West, supra note 56, at 78. 
77 Id. at 83. 
78 Whitson, supra note 15, at 388. 
79 CLEMMER-SMITH, supra note 4, at 22. 
80 See T. SCUDDER, No PLACE To Go (1982) for statistics which reflect how traditional Navajos 
reacted to their forced relocation from District 6 following the Healing v. Jones decision. See also, 
Big Mountain Notes, supra note 71, Spr. 1986, at 5, col. 1. 
81 Mander, supra note 11, at 52. 
82 Matthiessen, supra note 16, at 9, 19. 
8' Infant death rates on the reservations are twice as high as compared to other Americans, 
and the incidence of tuberculosis and rheumatic fever are 10 times more prevalent on the reser-
vations. See CLEMMER-SMITH, supra note 4, at 18. 
84 See generally id. 
85 Ninety percent of all tribal economies are supported by federal funds. See Barsh, When Will 
Tribes Have a Choice, in RETHINKING INDIAN LAw 43 (1982). 
86 25 U.S.C. 640 (1982). 
87Id. 
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Congress and traditional Native Americans considered the relocation Act even as 
amended to be "harsh, inhumane, and in need of repeal."88 
Since the 1980 amendment there has been additional legislative activity concerning 
Pub. L. No. 93-531. A compromise bill introduced by Rep. Udall was withdrawn when 
it came to Udall's attention that Sen. Goldwater and the Reagan administration opposed 
it.89 Before the 1987 term, Sen. Goldwater retired and now compromise legislation 
appears more likely. Arizona's Sen. McCain, has shown interest, as has Sen. DeConcini, 
in introducing a bill that would prevent some relocations and would change the config-
uration of the JUA. This compromise will reflect the Tribal Council's interests, which 
may be defined differently since Peter MacDonald, the current Navajo Tribal Council 
Chairman, was elected based on his promise to stop the relocations.90 Similarly, in 1986, 
Sen. Cranston introduced a one year moratorium and will introduce an expanded version 
in 1987 which calls for a moratorium on the relocation of people and the development 
of the "new lands" that are being acquired according to the 1974 legislation. The purpose 
of the development moratorium is to prevent the argument that "too many resources 
have been spent on the 'new lands' to stop relocation." A bill to repeal Pub. L. No. 93-
531 is likely to be introduced during the 1987 Congressional session which will present 
a viable alternative to relocation mandated by the 1974 Act or the proposed compromise 
legislation.91 
As of February 1987, three major court actions have been brought and a fourth is 
pending. All cases have been or will be brought on behalf of the relocatees by the Big 
Mountain Legal Offense/Defense Committee (BMLODC). One action seeks money dam-
ages in the U.S. Court of Claims for some relocatees because they were not provided 
"decent, safe, and sanitary housing," which the government has a statutory, fiduciary, 
and contractual obligation to provide.92 Another action, argues that the Act did not 
provide the relocatees with adequate counselling and assistance to make the adjustment 
from a non-market to a cash economy.93 The last of the current litigation is a criminal 
case involving the arrest of four traditionals who removed a fence from an area consid-
ered to be a Navajo religious shrine.94 Currently, a constitutional and international legal 
challenge to Pub. L. No. 93-531 is being planned for April/May 1987, arguing that the 
Act infringes on the traditional American's constitutional right to religious freedom.95 
Actions challenging the provisions of Pub. L. No. 93-531 have not been restricted 
to domestic forums. In 1980 and 1982 the traditional Hopi and the Indian Law Resource 
88 KAMMER, supra note 2, at 213 (quoting Senator DeConcini). 
89 Set H.R. 4174 (1986). See also Feds Back Down From July Big Mountain Eviction Date, The 
Guardian, June 18, 1986, at 9, col. 2. Some commentators believe that compromise legislation is 
unlikely while Sen. Goldwater remains in office. See Rocky Mtn News, June 16, 1986, at 21, col. 1. 
90 The Navajo-Hopi Land Dispute, Denver Post, Jan. 4, 1987, at 6E, col. 1; Big Mountain Notes, 
supra note 71, Spr. 1986, at I, col. 1. 
91 Telephone interview with Matt Strassburg, attorney for the Big Mountain Legal Offense! 
Defense Committee (Jan. 21, 1987) [hereinafter Strassburg interview]. See also Big Mountain Notes, 
supra note 71, Sum. 1986, at 1, col. 2. 
92 Strassburg interview, supra note 91. 
95 [d. 
94 [d. Defendants are asserting a necessity defense to the charge of destruction of public 
property on the grounds that they had to remove the fence to prevent imminent harm to the 
religious shrines. 
95 This challenge is being prepared in conjunction with the Center for Constitutional Rights. 
[d. See also "The Yellow Thunder Case" United States v. Means, 627 F. Supp. 247 (D.S.D. 1985). 
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Center brought an action before the United Nations Commission on Human Rights 
challenging the Big Mountain situation.96 Similarly, in July 1985, the traditional Navajo 
and the International Indian Treaty Council submitted arguments to the full working 
group session of the U.N. Human Rights Commission.·7 In March 1986, the Interna-
tional Indian Treaty Council presented an oral argument before the U.N. Working 
Group on Indigenous Populations.'s 
Petition in international fora is appropriate because Indian rights may be appro-
priately addressed through international law." International law protects Indian rights 
in two ways: Indian nations under international law are sovereign nations lOO and Indians 
are protected by international human rights law. lol 
III. LEGAL STATUS OF AMERICAN INDIANS 
Under international law, Indian nations are sovereign na~ions because they satisfy 
the requirements for nationhood. To.tle considered a &overeign nation under interna-
tional law a nation must have: 1) a population; 2) a territory; 3) a structure <>f governance; 
and 4) the capacity to conduct relatioQrS with other ri.~tions.102 In light of. these prereq-
uisites AmeriCan Indians are sovereign .nations as defined by international law. Indian 
~. ' . 1 F : 
tribes have identifiable populations as evidel~c!';? in their tribal heritage. The territories 
of Indian tribes are defined by their reservat~o~~. The tribal councils are the institution-
alized governing bodies of their territories. Finally, Indians negotiate with the U.S. 
government through their tribal councils. . 
Once an area meets the qualifications for nati~~hRop"however, its status as a nation 
may be revoked under international law through discovery; conquest, merger or annex-
ation by another nation. The concept of discovery is often u~~d as;a rationa~e to. dispute 
the sovereignty of native Americans. When an uninhabited land is disc~~~red bya ri~iion, 
that land cannot be considered sovereign if the discovering nation ex~~cises domi~ion 
over it. 105 Although America was not uninhabited when it was discovered,IM international 
law scholars argue that the concept of discovery applied to North America bec~i.ise the 
Indians were "wanderers." Discovery would not apply if the inhabitants of the discovered 
96 See Berkey, Coulter & Tullberg, supra note 42, at 161. 
.7 The arguments presented in this action are discussed in Churchill, supra note 19, and were 
reiterated during an interview with Ward Churchill, member of the International Indian Treaty 
Council, in Denver, CO, july 8, 1986 [hereinafter Churchill Interview]. 
'8/d. See also Telephone interview with Antonio Gonzales, member of the International Treaty 
Council,june 20,1986; See also Mander, supra note 11, at 53. 
99 Coulter, Contemporary Indian Sovereignty, in RETHINKING INDIAN LAw 109, 115 (1982). 
100 See Churchill, Implications of Treaty Relationships Between the United States of America and Various 
Indian Nations, 16(2) AKWESASNE NOTES 22 (1984) [hereinafter Implications of Treaty Relationships]; 
and Churchill, Indigenous Peoples of the United States: A Struggle Against Internal Colonialism, 16 BLACK 
SCHOLAR 29 (1985) [hereinafter Indigenous Peoples of the U.S.]. 
101 See O'Brien, Federal Indian Policies and the International Protection of Human Rights, in AMERICAN 
INDIAN POLICY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (V. Deloria ed. 1985). 
102 See OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 136 (8th ed. 1955). 
lOS Hayton, The Nations and Antarctica, 10 OSTERIECHISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FU OFFENTLICHES RECHT 
368, 390 (1960). Actual settlement on the land is required to confer title by discovery. 
104 F. JENNINGS, INVASION OF AMERICA: INDIANS, COLONIALISM. "ND THE CANT OF CONQUEST 60 
(1975). 
1987] BIG MOUNTAIN 73 
land are "stable."105 However, these scholars incorrectly characterized the civilization of 
Native Americans. American Indians were not wanderers, but had an established society 
and economy.l06 Consequently, the sovereignty of Indian nations was not extinguished 
when America was discovered. 
In domestic courts, John Marshall, the first Chief Justice of the United States 
Supreme Court, continually attempted to clarify the relationship of Indian nations to 
the United States. Justice Marshall recognized the civilization of American Indians and 
he properly questioned the applicability of discovery to determine the legal status of 
American Indians. 107 Justice Marshall was also hesitant to conclude that Indian nations 
had been legally or voluntarily merged into the United States. lOB Thus, to characterize 
the legal status of American Indians, Justice Marshall created the domestic dependent 
nation concept. Under this concept, "[A] weak state, in order to provide for its safety, 
may place itself under the protection of one more powerful, without stripping itself of 
the right of government, and ceasing to be a state."I09 The domestic dependent nation 
concept indicates that the U.S. and the Indian nations were initially viewed as a part of 
a defense pact, rather than two nations merging into one. Justice Marshall's domestic 
dependent nation concept indicates that early judicial interpretation of the legal status 
of American Indians did not strip American Indians of their sovereignty. 
Secondly, scholars argue that Indian nations are not sovereign because they have 
been merged into or annexed by the United States. These scholars base their argument 
on the fact that Native Americans are U.S. citizens. However, while the 1924 Native 
American Citizenship Act unilaterally imposed U.S. citizenship on all Native Americans 
who lived in territory claimed by the United States,1I0 it explicitly allows Indians to have 
concurrent citizenship in their respective tribes. II I Yet, the Citizenship Act is incongruent 
with international law because nations may confer citizenship only upon individuals 
requesting it. Governments cannot impose citizenship unilaterally.1I2 Hence, the Citizen-
ship Act did not destroy tribal sovereignty by a unilateral bestowal of U.S. citizenship 
on Native Americans. Furthermore, the U.S. government implicitly recognized the sov-
ereignty of Native Americans in the Citizenship Act because the Act preserves Native 
Americans' right to citizenship in their own tribes. 
IOSId. The Mayas and the Aztecs were considered "stable" Indians entitled to recognition by 
the international community. 
I06Id. at 65. For example, many of the tribes were characterized by a predominantly agricultural 
economy. 
107 Justice Marshall did, however, apply the discovery concept in Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 
(8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). Justice Marshall's misgivings concerning the applicability of the discovery 
concept to Native Americans is apparent in his statement: 
It is difficult to comprehend the proposition that the inhabitants of either quarter 
of the globe could have rightful original claims of dominion over the inhabitants of 
the other, or over the lands they occupied; or that discovery of either by [the] other 
should give the discoverer rights in the country discovered, which annulled the pre-
existing rights of its ancient possessors. 
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832). 
108 Coulter, supra note 99, at 118. 
109 Worcester, 31 U.S. at 559. 
110 Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, 8 U .S.C. § 140 I (a)(2). 
IIIId. 
112 The illegality of this act parallels the unilateral creation of separate black "homelands" by 
the South African government. See Dugard, South Africa'S Independent Homelands: An Exercise in 
Denationalization, 10 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'y II (1981). 
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Some Native American nations have always asserted their nationhood. lIS Like the 
Hopi who have consistently refused to form a formal treaty with the United States, some 
Indian tribes believe they have never abandoned their sovereignty to any foreign power 
or nation. II. Others, including the traditional Navajos at Big Mountain, have recently 
asserted their nationhood. ll5 The official position of the American Indian Movement 
(AIM) is that Indian peoples are citizens of both their Indian Nation and the United 
States. 116 
Despite the sovereignty of Indian nations under international law, the U.N. has only 
granted American Indians consultative status to the International Indian Treaty Coun-
cil.ll7 There are two barriers to recognition of indigenous groups at the U.N. First, 
current U.N. members are unwilling to recognize indigenous peoples' right to autonomy. 
Second, the U.N. does not approve of the representation at the General Assembly of 
segments or internal colonies within member nations.1I8 While the repugnance of exter-
nal colonies has gained wide acceptance in the international community, the idea of 
internal colonialism has yet to be adequately considered. This has created the ironic 
result that former external colonies have internal colonies of indigenous peoples. 119 
Currently, recognition of Indian tribes in the U.N. is limited to the Working Group on 
Indigenous Populations by the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination of 
the U.N. Commission on Human Rights. 120 
While the U.N. refuses to recognize the sovereignty of Indian tribes, it is unclear 
whether the U.S. recognizes that Indian tribes are sovereign nations under international 
law. In addition, the U.S. continues to vacilate on their position regarding the extent 
that international law regulates its interactions with Indian tribes. However, an indication 
of the U.S. position can be inferred from the fact that the U.S. entered into 371 treaties 
with various indigenous peoples from 1790-1870121 despite provisions of the U.S. Con-
stitution which restrict the U.S. government's treaty relationships to those with fully 
lIS For example, the Six Nation Confederacy, the Seneca, Cayuga, Onondaga, Mohawk, and 
Tuscarora nations, petitioned the League of Nations for membership in 1923 and the United 
Nations in 1977. See Address & Falkowski, Self-Determination: Indians and the United Nations - the 
Anomalous Status of America's "Domestic Dependent Nations", 8 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 97 (1980). 
114 McLeod, This Land is Sacred . .. It is not for Leasing or Sale, supra note 44. The Hopi traditional 
leaders declared: "Today we are being asked to file our land claims in the Land Claims Commission 
in Washington D.C. We as Hereditary Chieftains of the Hopi Tribe, cannot and will not file any 
claims .... We will not ask a white man, who came to us recently, for a piece of land that is already 
ours." 
115 On October 28, 1979, a community of traditional Navajo Indians who live around Big 
Mountain, issued a Declaration of Independence from the United States, the State of Arizona, and 
their Tribal Council. See Mander, supra note 11. 
116 Morris, Indians Belonged to Sovereign Nations - and sua Do, Rocky Mtn News, June 16, 1986, 
at 34. 
117 The U.N. has begun the formation of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations by 
the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination of the U.N. Commission on Human 
Rights. 
118 M.S. McDOUGAL & W.M. REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAw IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 
1552 (1981). 
119 See Indigenous Peoples of the U.S., supra note 100. Cuba's recognition of the Florida Seminoles 
as a sovereign nation is an example of a state recognizing the nationhood of an indigenous group. 
120 See Coulter, supra note 99, at 119; Ryan, United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Popula-
tions, in RETHINKING INDIAN LAw 175 (1982). 
121 Implications of Treaty Relationships, supra note 100. 
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sovereign nations. 122 Thus, by executing treaties with the Indian tribes, the U.S. govern-
ment has implicitly recognized the sovereignty of Indian nations. Furthermore, the 
relevance of international law to the U.S. policy toward Native Americans was reiterated 
in the "Abourezk Commission Report," the result of a 1978 Congressional study which 
concluded that: "[t]he relationship of the American Indian tribes to the United States is 
founded on principles of internationallaw."123 
Despite this implicit recognition of tribal sovereignty by Congress, the economic 
dependence of Native Americans on the United States government,124 has shifted the 
status of Indian nations under U.S. law from that of co-equal sovereigns to internal 
colonies. 125 Despite the delegation of Indian tribes to colonial status, the U.S. government 
has not respected the sovereignty of Indian nations. Thus, U.S. Indian law as evidenced 
through major cases and legislation contradicts international law and ignores Congres-
sional mandates. Generally, caselaw determining the legal status of American Indians 
attempts to rationalize the process of colonization and exploitation of the Indian Nations. 
Yet, despite any rationalizations, U.S. Indian law, even if contrary to international law, 
has had a profound effect on Native Americans. 126 For example, Indian law scholars 
note that: 
[Americans have assured themselves that these] national sins were of purely 
antiquarian significance [by] denying [the Indian's] existence as a people, or 
by taking refuge in the Myth of the Vanishing Indian, or by blaming our 
grand[parents] for the wrongs that we commit. 127 
Early judicial interpretaion of the legal status of Native Americans had little difficulty 
rationalizing the gradual destruction of Indian tribal sovereignty. In Worcester v. Geor-
gia,128 the Supreme Court held that although Indian nations were nations as defined in 
international law, they are not "foreign nations" within the meaning of Article III of the 
Constitution. 129 These decisions were used by both the courts and Congress to further 
erode the sovereignty of the Indian nations. In 1846, the Court in United States v. Rogers l30 
denied that the Indian tribes had ever constituted nations. By 1870, the Court in the 
Cherokee Tobacco Casel31 had decided that Indian territories were a part of the territory 
of the United States. The Court in 1883 held that an Indian nation was still sovereign 
over the acts of its citizens against other Indian citizens if the act occurred on Indian 
territory.132 Congress reacted to these decisions by passing legislation that further limited 
Indian sovereignty.133 
122 U.S. CONST. art. I. It should also be noted that treaties constitute "the supreme law of the 
land." 
123 DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 18, at 228. 
124Id. at 1-27. 
125 For an explanation of internal colonialism see STAVENHAGEN, supra note 31, at 39. 
126 Coulter, supra note 99, at 5, 6. 
127 Cohen, Indian Claims, The American Indian, in THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE: SELECTED PAPERS OF 
FELIX S. COHEN 264 (1970). 
128 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
129 31 U.S. (5 Pet.) 8, 19 (1832). 
130 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 572 (1846). 
13l 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616 (1871). 
132 Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883). 
133 Seven Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1970). For a comparison of the interference 
with the internal affairs of Indians to the pattern of colonialism that occurred in Africa see Address 
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As Indian tribal sovereignty was eroded by United States courts and Congress, the 
trust concept was created to characterize the relationship between the U.S. government 
and the Indian tribes. Under the trust concept, Native Americans were regarded as 
wards of the State and their property was held in a trust by the United States govern-
ment. 134 Proponents of the trust concept analogize the trust relationship between the 
United States and Native Americans to the trusteeship system of the United Nations. 135 
For example, the United States and South Africa are trustees for Micronesia and Namibia 
respectively; both trustee nations are mandated to work toward the eventual self-deter-
mination of those under trust. 136 However, this analogy is incorrect because while the 
United States is explicitly committed to self-determination for Namibia and Micronesia, 
it is not committed to self-determination for the Indian nations. 
The trust relationship was developed through a series of cases and statutes. In Lone 
Wolf v. Hitchcock,137 the Supreme Court upheld Congress' unilateral abrogation of Indian 
treaties, despite the Indian trust relationship because Congressional power over Indians 
was "plenary and not subject to limitation by treaty."138 This plenary power has been 
applied by the courts since the turn of the century. For example, in Santa Clara Pueblo 
v. Martinez,139 the Court held that Congress has the plenary authority when it chooses to 
exercise its authority to limit or eliminate the powers of local self-government which the 
tribes otherwise possess. The Court in the Western Shoshones case implicitly affirmed that 
an Indian tribe's acceptance of money for property taken by the U.S. government is not 
needed in order to clear title to Indian land; the mere award of money is sufficient. 140 
These judicial decisions reflect the U.S. government's legislative policy toward In-
dians in the late 19th century. The 1887 General Allotment Act, which subdivided most 
reservations into individual 40 or 160 acre tracts, embodied the heart of the government's 
policy. 141 The allotment scheme was an attempt to break up the "tribal mass" and promote 
assimilation. 142 However, in 1934, the federal government changed its policy towards the 
Indians. The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, (IRA), stopped further allotment of 
tribal property and allowed tribes to continue communal ownership of their lands. 143 
The IRA was intended to revive the tribe, by giving it more authority. 1 .. Congress' 
& Falkowski, supra note 113, at 102, (citing: M. LINDLEY, THE ACQUISITION AND GOVERNMENT OF 
BACKWARD TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 182 (1926». 
134 Address & Falkowski, supra note 113, at 102. See also United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 
(1886). The trust further increased U.S. authority over the Indians. 
135 Coulter, supra note 99, at 119. 
136Id. 
137 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903). 
138Id. 
139 436 U.S. 49, at 56 (1978). 
140 See Western Shoshones Legal Defense & Ed. Ass'n v. U.S., 531 F.2d 495, cert. denied, 429 
U.S. 885 (1976). See also Luebben, Western Shoshone Identifiable Group, in RETHINKING INDIAN LAW 
63 (1982). 
141 The General Allotment Act of 1887 "The Dawes Act," 25 U.S.C. § 331 et seq. Under the 
Dawes Act, tribal lands passed into the settler's ownership. See O'Brien, supra note 101. 
142 O'Brien, supra note 101, at 43, (quoting President T. Roosevelt's description of the benefits 
of the Dawes Act). 
143 25 U.S.C. 467 et seq. See also DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 18. 
144 See generally DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 18 for a complete account of the events prompting 
the enactment of the IRA and a discussion of the differences between John Collier's vision of the 
IRA and the final Act. 
1987] BIG MOUNTAIN 77 
favorable view towards the Indians prevailed until the 1950's, when Congress adopted 
its termination policy. Under the termination policy, Congress gave itself the authority 
to extinguish recognized titles and abrogate treaties without provision for fair compen-
sation as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. 
Congress' termination policy stimulated145 the decision of Tee-Hit-Ton Indiaru v. 
United States.146 In Tee-Hit-Ton, the Court decided that title to land previously granted to 
the Indians by treaty or statute may be unilaterally extinguished by an act of Congress. 
This decision was based on the erroneous conclusion that Indian titles were derived 
from the permission of the settlers to occupy the land. Thus, the Indian's right to 
occupancy may be terminated without any legally enforceable obligation to compensate 
the Indians.147 This rationale is inapplicable because the Indians never lost their right 
to their land as they were not discovered148 or conquered149 by the settlers. In effect, the 
termination policy produced the unilateral termination of Indian nations because na-
tionhood resided in the tribes only so long as they had a defined territory. ISO Thus, no 
government body, either federal or international, would recognize Indian tribes as 
nations. 151 
The termination policy established in the Tee-Hit-Ton decision is questionable prec-
edent. In 1980, the Supreme Court in Sioux Nation of Indiaru v. United States,lSt deter-
mined that the United States had violated the 1868 Fort Laramie treaty with the Lakota 
Indians (Sioux). The Lakota refused to accept the money offered as compensation for 
the land illegally taken by the federal government. Their refusal effectively blocked a 
quiet title action with regard to much of the Black Hills region. 15S While the case is still 
being litigated, there is a bill before Congress to return a sizeable part of the land illegally 
taken to the Lakota nation.154 
Currently, the United States government has almost complete control over tribal 
lands. Therefore, it is difficult to determine whether a "trust" relationship exists. The 
relationship cannot be a fiduciary trust because in United States v. Mitchell155 the Court 
held that the federal government is not accountable to the Indians as a trustee. In 
Mitchell, the government acted to protect white settlers who had moved onto land set 
14S Berkey, Coulter & Tullberg, Violations of Human Rights of American Indian Peoples by the United 
States of America, in RETHINKING INDIAN LAw 141, 145 (1982). 
146 348 U.S. 272, 278 (1955). 
147/d. at 279. 
148 See supra notes 103-107 and accompanying text. In addition, Native Americans did not exist 
under the same tide system as the Anglo based U.S. system, but the various tribes did have a system 
of demarcation of land for use. See JENNINGS, supra note 104, at 67. This complete disregard for 
the indigenous system has been described by one critic as an example of blind eurocentrism: 
"Indians could adopt the ideology of being the same, but different, whereas with the Europeans 
something different means something inferior or superior." See THE GREAT SIOUX NATION -
SITTING IN JUDGMENT ON AMERICA 68 (R.D. Ortiz ed. 1977). 
14G Forbes, The "Public Domain" of Nevada and Its Relationship to Indian Property Rights, 30 NEVADA 
STATE BARj. 16,32 (1965). 
ISO See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
lSI Termination would be similar to self-determination if complete control was turned over to 
the tribe. However, the result was forced assimilation, for previous conditions imposed upon the 
Indians made self-reliance impossible. See generaUy DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 18. 
152 448 U.S. 371 (1980). 
Issld. 
154 "Bradely Bill," Sen. Bill No. 14-53, introduced july 17, 1985. 
IS5445 U.S. 535 (1980). 
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aside for the Pueblo Indians by passing the Pueblo Lands Act which spared the white 
settlers from the hardship of relocation. 156 The Court upheld the government's actions 
even though it acted for the benefit of a third party, the settlers, against the interests of 
the beneficiaries, the Indians. This action by the U.S. government does not meet the 
usual duty of a trustee. 
Even if a trust relationship does exist between the U.S. government and the Indian 
Tribes, the trust principle has been vehemently criticised. Some scholars have described 
the Indian trust relationship as "racial discrimination and unfettered United States power 
disguised as a moral duty."157 Others comment that in comparison to the Native Amer-
icans trust status: "only infants, incompetents and mentally infirm wards of the state are 
subjected to similar governmental power over their property under United States law."158 
Yet, despite such criticism, the trust relationship has been used to deny Indian nations 
their sovereignty and allows the federal government to avoid the limitations of consti-
tutional and international law in its rela.tionship with Native Americans. 159 
Under international law, the sovereignty of Indian tribes is clear. Indian tribes satisfy 
the prerequisites of a sovereign nation because they have an identifiable population and 
territory with a structure of government that can conduct relations with other nations. 
Moreover, the civilization of the American Indians precludes the concept of discovery 
to establish them as a subservient nation nor does history indicate any attempt by the 
U.S. government to conquer, merge or annex the Indian tribes. Domestic Indian law, 
however, has used several policies ranging from the domestic dependent nation to the 
termination policy, finally placing Indian nations in a trust relationship to rationalize the 
erosion of Indian tribal sovereignty. These policies ignore the U.S. Constitution's man-
date that treaty relationships must be between sovereign nations. The fact that the U.S. 
has entered into numerous treaties with the Indian tribes indicates the government's 
implicit recognition of the sovereignty of Indian nations. Yet, in situations such as Big 
Mountain the U.S. government continues to use Indian policy to justify its violations of 
constitutional and international law in its relations with Native Americans. The violations 
of international law inherent in the U.S. Indian law and policy are magnified by a 
consideration of international human rights law. 
IV. OVERVIEW OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 
A. Contemporary International Human Rights Law 
Although international human rights law does not expressly protect indigenous 
populations, ISO the preamble to the United Nations Charter proposes to: 
156 Shifter &: West, supra note 56, at 101. Although the government compensated the Indians 
for their land, this is not the course of action that would have benefitted the Pueblos the most. 
157 Indian Law Resource Center, supra note 23, at 19. 
158 Coulter, supra note 99. 
159 Address &: Falkowski, supra note 113. 
160 The U.N. Human Rights Commission Working Group on Indigenous Populations published 
the first extensive report on the rights of indigenous peoples under international law in 1986. See 
J.R. Coba. Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Pro-
tection of Minorities, I Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations 3, ElCN AI 
Sub.2/198617 . 
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reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the 
human person [and to] promote social progress and better standards of life 
in larger freedom [and, for these ends,] to employ international machinery 
for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples. 161 
79 
Thus, the United Nations Charter indicates that human rights and international law are 
designed to assist all people to reach their goals and to advance, without compelling 
assimilation into Western culture. This is the crucial difference between the protection 
of fundamental rights by the United States Constitution and the protection of funda-
mental rights through international human rights law. 
Undoubtedly, the greatest protection of human rights available to Americans in 
general is the federal Constitution, which provides broader rules and more effective 
implementation mechanisms than international law. 162 While this view may be correct 
for certain situations, such as the struggle for full participation in the already existing 
system by women and minorities, it is not necessarily true for Native Americans. Native 
Americans are not trying to achieve equal opportunity in a system imposed upon them, 
but are struggling to maintain their own values and social system. Furthermore, the U.S. 
Constitution concentrates on protecting the rights of the individual, while international 
human rights law protects both individual and group rights. 163 It is widely accepted that 
this body of human rights law protects individuals and groups from the acts of their 
own government. 164 Since the State is potentially a major violator of human rights, an 
entity other than the State should be entrusted to protect human rights. 165 Therefore, 
the international community and international law are entrusted with the protection of 
basic human rights. Consequently, the rights of Native Americans are better protected 
by international law than the U.S. Constitution. Indeed, the major obstacle to the ad-
vancement of Native Americans' human rights may be the U.S. government. Often, the 
fundamental difficulty in the application of human rights law is that a State's overzealous 
adherence to an ideology blinds it to the violations it is committing. 166 The United States, 
for example, in its commitment to achieve economic growth may simply overwhelm a 
society which is struggling to hold onto its own ideology and methods to achieve its goals. 
161 The U.N. Charter defines a people as human beings which make up a group or assembly 
linked by a common, usually political, interest. Thus, a nation would constitute a people, and under 
a liberal interpretation of the Charter, a band or clan of Native Americans should constitute a 
people. 
162 Chen, Institutions Specialized to the Protection of Human Rights in the United States, I HUM. RTS. 
ANN. 3 (1983). 
163 Bassiouni, The Protection of 'Collective Victims' in International Law, 2 HUM. RTS. ANN. 239, 
245-250 (1985), acknowledges that the trend in international law has been to increase awareness 
and protection of group rights. This trend was reflected recently in the Charter of the Organization 
of African Unity (OAU), which recognizes group/tribal needs and rights. For example, Article 22 
of the Charter explicitly recognizes the "right" of "peoples" to realize "economic, political and 
cultural development." It also imposes the "duty" on "states" to ensure the exercise of this right. 
Paul & Dias, supra note 40, at 15. It is a commonly held misconception that human rights law is 
still limited to the individual. See Jones, Legal Strategies for Cultural Survival and Human Rights, 10 
CULTURAL SURVIVAL Q. 69 (1986). 
164 See, e.g., Humphrey, The Implementation of International Human Rights Law, 24 N.Y.L. SCH. L. 
REv. 33 (1978). 
165 L. KRUPER, GENOCIDE 94 (1985). 
166 R. FALK, HUMAN RIGHTS AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY 39 (1981). 
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This is exemplified by the numerous human rights violations incurred by the U.S. 
government by support of legislation resulting in the Big Mountain relocation. 167 
1. Right to Self-Determination 
The forced relocation at Big Mountain violates the Hopi and Navajo's right to self-
determination under international law. Principles of international law establish the na-
tionhood status of the traditional Hopi and Navajo.16s The relationship between the 
Hopi and Navajo nations and the United States, however, is characteristic of a colonial 
reiationship.169 The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, which implemented govern-
mental organizations for the Indian reservation without considering Indian needs or 
traditions, may have been intended to promote democracy, but in effect it maintained 
the colonial reiationship.170 
This colonial status of the Hopi and Navajo, however, entitles them to the right to 
self-determination. The covenant of self-determination in international law applies only 
to colonial situations because applying self-determination in a non-colonial context would 
grant the right of secession to a minority group.l7l 
Articles 1 and 55 of the United Nations Charter mandate the self-determination of 
peoples. Article 55 states: 
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which 
are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on 
respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, 
the United Nations shall promote ... universal respect for, and observance 
of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to 
race, sex, language or religion. 172 
Native Americans meet the definition of "peoples" as defined by the International Court 
of Justice. Therefore, Native Americans are not merely a racial minority, but are nations 
entitled to self-determination. 173 
Similarly, Native Americans may derive their right to self-determination from Article 
1 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights which states: 
"[alII peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
167 The numerical order in which the violations appear in this paper is the product of my own 
subjective evaluation of a combination of factors such as the extent the principle is universally 
accepted, and the application of the principle to this situation. 
168 Coulter, supra note 99, at 117. 
169 Churchill, supra note 19, at 10. 
170 Barsh, supra note 85, at 43. 
171 Sornarajah, Internal Colonialism and Humanitarian Intervention, 11 GA. J. INT'L & COMPo L. 45 
(1981). The fear is that states would be subject to disintegration if claims to secession on the basis 
of ethnicity were permitted. Id. at 50. 
172 U.N. CHARTER art. 55. 
173 See Jones, supra note 163, at 70. Thus, it is improper to argue that Article 2(7) of the United 
Nations Charter, which states the U.N. should not intervene in situations that are essentially within 
the jurisdiction of member states, applies when it is an action between sovereign nations. See U.N. 
CHARTER art. 2(7). 
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development."174 The right to self-determination is also recognized in Article 1 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,175 and Article II sections (b) and 
(c) of the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime 
of "Apartheid," particularly section (c) which prohibits: 
Deliberate imposition on a racial group or groups of living conditions cal-
culated to cause its or their physical destruction in whole or in part; Any 
legislative measures or other measures calculated to prevent a racial group 
or groups from participation in the political, social, economic and cultural 
life .... 176 
In addition to the mandates of international organizations, within international law 
is a growing body of indigenous rights law. A scholar who has applied indigenous rights 
law to the Native American situation has stated: 
The rights of the Native American people are derived from neither the 
Constitution, Congress, the positive State, the theory of republic democracy 
nor the philosophy of the Enlightenment. Rather these rights are inherent 
in the existence of the Native American people, as all human rights inhere 
in the condition of being human.I77 
The right of the Hopi and Navajo to self-determination is premised on their rec-
ognition as nations and their right to exist inherent in their "condition of being human." 
2. Prohibition of Genocide 
"Genocides [are] a continuing phenomenon of our times .... "178 Although most 
people envision the holocaust at the mention of genocide, genocide covers a broad range 
of heinous activities. 179 "Genocide is ... a structural and systematic destruction of in-
nocent people by a state bureaucratic apparatus."180 Genocide may also be defined as a 
gradation of destruction: "to what degree [a government] permits the official and arbi-
trary termination of the lives of its citizens." 181 Genocide is not some incredible aberration 
but is carried out through strict adherence to the law of the land. 182 
174 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights U.N. Doc. N6316 (1967), 
reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967) [hereinafter Social and Cultural Rights). While the President of the 
United States has signed this Covenant, the Senate has not ratified it. 
175 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967), reprinted in 6 
l.L.M. 368, 369 (1967) [hereinafter Civil and Political Rights). Similarly, the President of the United 
States has signed the Covenant, but the Senate has yet to ratify it. 
176 U.N. Doc. A/Resl3068/1973, reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 50, 53 (1974) [hereinafter Crime of 
Apartheid). 
I77 Krauss, The Irony of Native American "Rights," 8 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 409, 411 (1983). 
178 KRUPER, supra note 165, at vii. 
179 Churchill, Genocide: Toward a Functional Definition, II ALTERNATIVES 403, 407-408 (1986). 
G.A. Res. 96(1) made on December II, 1946, specifically states that "many instances of such crimes 
of genocide have occurred wherein racial, religious, political and other groups have been destroyed 
entirely or in part." 
iso [d. at 412 (quoting I.L. HOROWITZ, TAKING LIVES: GENOCIDE AND STATE POWER (1982). 
181 [d. 
182 [d. at 409 (citing H. ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL 
(1965». 
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In February of 1986, the U.S. Senate ratified the Genocide Convention.18s The 
relevant parts of the treaty state: 
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts com-
mitted with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, 
or religious group as such: ... 
b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring 
about its physical destruction in whole or in part; 
d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 
The following acts shall be punishable: 
a) Genocide; 
b) Conspiracy to commit genocide; 
c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide; 
d) Attempt to commit genocide; 
e) Complicity in genocide. 184 
However, the legislative history surrounding the ratification of the genocide conventions 
indicates that the treaty ratified by the United States is limited. 185 The U.S. Genocide 
Treaty is limited so that the U.S. does not owe a duty to the entire international 
community to refrain from perpetrating actions which may constitute genocide. 186 In 
comparision, international law encompasses a broader view of the prohibition of geno-
cide. 187 Under international law victims of genocide are classified as collective victims 
protected under international criminal law and international human rights law. 188 
Through the enactment of Pub. L. No. 93-531, the United States government, by 
definition, may be sanctioning genocide. Pub. L. No. 93-531 has, in effect, caused actual 
deaths as a result of the relocation.189 However, whether the U.S. is committing genocide 
depends on the government's intent. The "killing" of a group can, but does not neces-
sarily, imply the physical liquidation of individual group members. A group may be 
destroyed even when its individual members survive. 190 This leads to the issue of whether 
the desire to completely "civilize" or assimilate the Native Americans meets the required 
mens rea for genocide. Previously the lack of intent has been used to excuse genocidal 
practices against indigenous populations. The defense that the racial destruction was the 
unintended consequences of economic "development" is, however, losing credibility.19l 
18' This Week in Congress, Feb. 21, 1986, at 5. The version finally ratified is less effective than 
the original international Convention. The Senate's version exempts the United States from com-
pulsory jurisdiction of the World Court in genocide treaty cases. See also Decades-Old Genocide Treaty 
Finally Wins State Approval, CONGo Q. 458 (Feb. 22, 1986) [hereinafter Decades-Old Genocide Treaty]. 
184 The Genocide Treaty arts. 2, 3 IS521-2. 
185Id. 
186Id. See also Starkman, Genocide and International Law: Is There a Cause of Action, 8 ASILS INT'L 
L. J. 1, 23 (1984). 
187 See generally KRUPER, supra note 165. 
188 Decades-Old Genocide Treaty, supra note 183. 
189 Churchill, supra note 19, at 8, 14. 
190 Churchill, supra note 179, at 409; See also KRUPER, supra note 165, at 7, 9. 
191 KRUPER, supra note 165; See also Coba, supra note 160. 
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However, given the atrocities committed by states against their own citizens, many 
countries accept a broad definition of genocide. i92 Generally, genocide is the denial of 
the right of existence to an entire human group. 
[G]enocide does not necessarily mean the immediate destruction of a nation, 
except when accomplished by mass killings of all members of a nation. It is 
intended rather to signify a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at 
the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with 
the aim of annihilating the groups themselves. The objectives of such a plan 
would be the disintegration of the political and social institutions, of culture, 
language, national feelings, religion, and the economic existence of national 
groups, and the destruction of the personal security, liberty, health, dignity, 
and even the lives of the individuals belonging to such groups. Genocide is 
directed against the national group as an entity, and the actions involved are 
directed against individuals, not in their individual capacity, but as members 
of the national group.i9S 
Thus, genocide has two phases: (1) destruction of the national pattern 
of the oppressed group; and (2) implementation of the national pattern of 
the oppressor. i94 
Evidence of both phases of genocide exists in the history of Native Americans. 
Anthropologists contend there are fewer racially pure Native Americans because of 
assimilation. i95 "Genocide can take the form of what anthropologists have called decul-
turation, and it can involve the disintegration of some or all of the following: political 
and social institutions, culture, language, national feelings, religion, economic stability, 
personal security, liberty, health and dignity."i96 In other words, genocide need not 
require the death of individuals, but rather the death of their ethnicity. 
Some scholars separate the crimes of genocide and ethnocide into two distinct 
phenomena: 
... short of genocide, ethnocide is also a monstrous crime, as it destroys the 
cultural dignity, and identity of all the members of a people, and very likely 
destroys their mental and physical health as well as their unique world views 
and traditional knowledge .... i97 
Regardless of how international legal scholars classify the destruction of the traditional 
Native American culture and society, the corresponding U.S. Indian policy has been and 
remains in violation of international law. 
i.2 See generally Berkey, Coulter & Tullberg, supra note 42. Some scholars have argued that a 
broad reading and application of the Genocide Convention is the only appropriate approach to the 
crime of genocide. See Churchill, supra note 179 . 
•• 5 Churchill, supra note 179, at 9, (citing R. LEMKIN, AXIS RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE 79 
(1944». 
'''!d . 
•• 5 CLEMMER-SMITH, supra note 4. 
'96 Churchill, supra note 179, at 421 (quoting GENOCIDE IN PARAGUAY 137 (R. Arens ed. 1976». 
'·'[d. 
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3. Right to Equality 
While a state may not actually commit ethnocide, a state may similarly destroy a 
culture through racial discrimination. Pub: L. No. 93-531 isolates persons of a certain 
ethnic originl98 and thus discriminates against Native Americans. l99 The Big Mountain 
relocation is the first time in American history that the government has implemented a 
relocation scheme to resolve an Indian land claim. Generally, when Indian land claims 
affect non-Indians who have settled on Indian land, some form of compensation is 
offered to the Indians as "settlement" for their right to the land.2°O 
The discrimination inherent in Pub. L. No. 93-531 violates existing international 
law. Article 1 and Article 55 of the United Nations Charter attempts to promote and 
preserve equal rights without racial distinction.201 In addition, Article 7 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights states: 
All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to 
equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any 
discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement of 
such discrimination.202 
Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights details more 
specifically the right to equal protection and the prohibition against discrimination.203 
However, the most important document indicating the contemporary status of the law 
prohibiting racial discrimination is contained in the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, which states: 
Each State Party shall take effective measures to review governmental, na-
tional, and local policies, and to amend, rescind or nullify any laws and 
regulations which have the effect of creating or perpetuating racial discrim-
ination wherever it exists; .... State parties shall, when the circumstances so 
warrant, take, in the social, economic, cultural and other fields, special and 
concrete measures to ensure the adequate development and protection of 
certain racial groups or individuals belonging to them, for the purpose of 
guaranteeing them the full and equal enjoyment of human rights and free-
doms.2M 
Finally, the World Conference to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination mandated 
not only that states take action to end racial discrimination, but also resolved that the 
international community take action to achieve its total elimination.205 The tenth Inter-
American Conference stated that all persons are entitled to a world without discrimi-
198 25 U.S.C. 640. 
199 Churchill, supra note 19, at 9. 
200 Churchill Interview, supra note 97. E.g., 1924 Pueblo Land Act ch. 331, Pub. L. No. 68-253, 
43 Stat. 636; and the 1971 Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act Pub. L. No. 92-203, 43 U.S.C. 
1601. 
2<l1 U.N. CHARTER art. 1(3). 
2<l2 U.N. Doc. Al810 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration]. 
203 Civil and Political Rights, supra note 175. Support for this law is in the Helsinki Final Act, 
Basket I, Principle VII and in the American Convention on Human Rights, reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 
673 (1970) [hereinafter American Convention]. 
204 Articles 2(l)(c) and 2(2), 660 U.N.T.S. 195, reprinted in 5 I.L.M. 352 (1966) [hereinafter 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination]. 
205 G.A. Res. 17:260, Jan. 1978, Res. 3157 (XXVIII) [hereinafter Combat Racism]. 
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nation and equal protection of the law.206 Thus, there is ample international law sup-
porting equal protection for Native Americans. To ensure that they will be treated equally 
and insulated from racial discrimination Native Americans must be afforded participa-
tion in the political process. 
4. Right to Participation in the Political Process and the Economy 
The input into the political process by traditional Native Americans is severely 
limited and usually non-existent.207 For example, more than two thirds of the Hopi still 
boycott the elections of the Tribal Council, the federally imposed tribal government.208 
The traditional Hopi and Navajo continue to maintain their own forms of government.209 
This lack of political efficacy is contrary to the principles of international law. A~ticle 
21(3) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that the will of the people 
should be the basis of the authority of government.210 This provision is supported by 
the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, Article 1 and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Article I, which states: "All peoples 
have the right to ... freely determine their political status and freely pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development."211 The Universal Declaration of the Rights 
of Peoples states: "Every people ... shall determine its political status freely and without 
foreign interference."212 Consequently, under international law the Tribal Council is not 
a valid governing body because it lacks the support of the majority of Hopi. A govern-
ment without the support of its people lacks authority. Hence, the Hopi Tribal Council 
does not have the authority to lobby or initiate legislation such. as Pub. L. No. 93-531. 
Accordingly, the U.S. government, in negotiating with a government that lacks authority, 
ignores the mandates of international law. 
In addition to the federally imposed tribal councils which as governing bodies do 
not have the support of a majority of their constituency, traditional Native Americans 
are kept politically powerless because they lack the ability to actively participate in the 
economy. The Native Americans have been forced into the market economy.2U Their 
resources are held in "trust" by the government,214 and their means to subsistence and 
206 Coba, supra note 160, at 135. 
207 Tullberg, The Creation and Decline of the Hopi Tribal Council, in RETHINKING INDIAN LAw 29, 
30 (1982). 
208 CLEMMER-SMITH, supra note 4. While every Hopi over 18 years of age has the right to 
participate in the elections of the Hopi Tribal Council, and states and federal representatives, they 
believe that participation would be tantamount to recognizing the fact that the Hopi tribe is no 
longer a sovereign nation. However, Hopi participation in the American electoral system increased 
between 40 and 45% in the last two elections held in 1980 and 1984. 
209 Id. 
210 Universal Declaration, supra note 202. 
211 See supra notes 175, 174. 
212 Universal Declaration on the Rights of Peoples art. 5. reprinted in 3 ALTERNATIVES 280 
[hereinafter Rights of Peoples]. 
215 CLEMMER-SMITH, supra note 4. 
214 Berkey, Coulter & Tullberg, supra note 42, at 164. The trust relationship between the federal 
government and the Indian tribes is "unique." The Native Americans, usually through the tribal 
councils, are given some authority on who and what part of the land is to be leased for "develop-
ment." The lease is then subject to approval by the U.S. government. It should be noted that 
Indians hold tenuous claims to their property. The U.S. adheres to the fiction that most Indian 
reservations exist because the United States allows the Indians to use a certain parcel ofland. Thus, 
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self-sufficiency have all but been removed because of the livestock reduction mandated 
by Pub. L. No. 93-531.215 The result is that Native Americans have nearly the lowest 
standard of living of any ethnic group in America.216 
U.S. Indian policy responsible for these results are in violation of international law. 
Article 55 of the United Nations Charter obligates states to strive to improve economic 
conditions which disadvantage their people.217 The International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights further states: "In no case maya people be deprived of its 
own means of subsistence."218 In addition, the United Nations General Assembly has 
passed a resolution calling for the complete and permanent sovereignty for peoples over 
their resources.219 Article II of the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Peoples states: 
"Every people has the right to choose its own economic and social system and pursue its 
own path to economic development freely and without any foreign interference."220 
Consequently, the U.S. actions which deprive the Hopi and Navajo of their livestock and 
land, and hence, their livelihood, in the Big Mountain area violate international law. 
The loss of their land has a profound effect upon the Indians' culture and religion. 
5. Right to Maintain Traditional Culture and Religion 
Although Native American culture is considered an artifact,221 parts of Native Amer-
ican culture have survived. The United States school systems, however, continue to ignore 
the ancient indigenous cultures. Furthermore, classes taught on the reservations do not 
incorporate aspects of native culture in educational programs.222 
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the In-
ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provide principles of international law 
that protect Native American culture. These covenants state respectively: "[a]1I peoples 
have the right to .. . freely determine their political status and freely pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development."22! The International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights further specifies in Article 27 that: "persons ... shall not be denied the 
right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, 
to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language."224 
Essentially, the right to maintain one's indigenous culture is the right to be free 
from cultural domination.225 In many ways, the current movement towards a consumerist 
homogeneous society has been accelerated by the government's efforts to assimilate the 
land can be taken from the Indians when the government sees fit. See Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. 
United States,348 U.S. 272 (1955). 
215 KAMMER, supra note 2. 
216 CLEMMER-SMITH, supra note 4. 
217 U.N. CHARTER art. 55. 
218 Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 174. 
219 G.A. Res. 1803 (XXII). 
220 Rights of Peoples, supra note 212. 
221 DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 18, at 250. 
222 [d. For example, attempts to fund bilingual education for Native Americans have been 
generally unsuccessful. 
225 Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 174. The idea of respect for culture can also be found 
in the World Conference to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination, and the actions taken by 
the Organization of American States. 
224 See Civil and Political Rights, supra note 175. 
225 See Coba, supra note 160, at 237. 
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Indians into contemporary American culture.226 However, cultural domination, through 
government policies, foreign education and the mass media which present western 
culture as the only "civilized" culture, is generally condemned by principles of interna-
tional law.227 
The Navajo's spirituality centers on their physical relationship with specific geo-
graphic areas.228 The Hopi place a religious significance on the earth and nature.229 
Thus, both the Hopi and Navajo consider Big Mountain to be Holy Ground.230 Article 
18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights declares that "[n]o one 
shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion 
or belief of his choice."231 
Recently the United Nations affirmed their protection of both theistic and non-
theistic religions, by adopting the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intol-
erance and Discrimination Based on Religious Belief. Noteworthy are Articles 1(1) and 
4(2), which state respectively: 
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. 
This right shall include freedom to have religion or whatever belief of his 
choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in 
public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, 
practice and teaching. 
All States shall make all efforts to enact or rescind legislation where necessary 
to prohibit any such discrimination, and to take all appropriate measures to 
combat intolerance on the grounds of religion or other beliefs in this mat-
ter.232 
These provisions are evidence of the international community's support of the right of 
a peoples to maintain their own beliefs and not to have an alien religion imposed upon 
them.233 Therefore, the U.S. actions depriving the Indians at Big Mountain of their Holy 
Ground would probably be condemned by the international community as inhibiting 
their freedom of religion and forcing the abandonment of cultural values. Furthermore, 
the U.S. actions also violate the Indians' right to own property. 
6. Right to Own Property 
The United States has plenary authority over tribal lands. Thus, the 5th Amendment 
protection against the government's "taking" of property without due process of law 
does not apply. Lands "owned" by Native Americans in common are treated and have 
226 CLEMMER-SMITH, supra note 4. 
227 Coba, supra note 160, at 237. 
228 Churchill, supra note 19 (citing R. UNDERHILL, THE NAVAJOS (1956)). 
229 CLEMMER-SMITH, supra note 4, at 4l. 
2S0 Indian Law Resource Center, Oral Intervention, August 31,1981 Regarding Big Mountain and 
Statement of United States Observer, in RETHINKING INDIAN LAW 169 (1982). 
2S1 Civil and Political Rights, supra note 175. This right is supported by the following documents: 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 18; American Convention on Human Rights, art. 
12; American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, art. 3; International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, art. 5 (d)(vii); and Helsinki Final Act, Principle 
7. 
2S2 G.A. Res. 36/55 (1981). 
m See generally Rights of Peoples, supra note 212. 
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always been treated differently from land owned individually by all Native American 
Indians. Real estate owned personally by a Native American is entitled to 5th Amendment 
protection.234 For tribal land under the U.S. government's plenary authority, courts need 
only consider whether the expropriation was within the intent to revoke the tribe's right 
of "occupancy." If the intent is to remove occupancy, the Indians have no recourse in 
U.S. courts.235 
Article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: "[e]veryone has the 
right to own property alone as well as in association with another."236 That law is 
supported by article 5(d)(v) of the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination;237 and Article 21 of American Convention on Human 
Rights. 238 The Declaration of Barbados II, which prohibits any form of physical domi-
nation of a peoples states: "Physical domination is reflected first and foremost in the 
plundering of our land."239 The Declaration of Barbados II reflects Article 2 of the 
International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention which states: "[t]he right of own-
ership, collective or individual, of the members of the populations concerned over the 
lands which these populations traditionally occupy shall be recognized."240 Thus, by 
denying Native Americans the right to compensation for lands which they have tradi-
tionally occupied at Big Mountain, the U.S. government has again ignored fundamental 
principles of human rights. 
B. Developing International Human Rights Law 
Currently, new facets of international human rights law are being developed. In-
cluded in this new international law is the right to a clean environment, the right to 
development as a people, and indigenous rights law. Each of these developing facets of 
human rights law are applicable to the situation of Native Americans at Big Mountain. 
The Native American's right to a clean environment is an important issue because 
the once pristine air over the four corners area encompassing Big Mountain is polluted. 
The area has become polluted because of the mining and processing in the Black Mesa 
region which has caused the region to be classified as an environmental sacrifice area.241 
Pollution from neighboring lands regularly impinges the quality of the environment of 
the reservation. 242 
In the last decade, international environmental law has developed rapidly into an 
extensive body of law.243 Assuming the nationhood of the Hopi and Navajo tribes, 
protection against environmental destruction would be derived from Article 21 of the 
Declaration on the Human Environment, which states: 
234 See generally id. 
235 Berkey, Coulter & Tullberg, supra note 145 at 143-44. 
236 Universal Declaration, supra note 202. 
237 Elimination of Racial Discrimination, supra note 204. 
238 American Convention, supra note 203. 
239 Coba, supra note 160, at 237. 
240 The Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal Populations in Independent 
Countries, 19571. L. o. 107,328 U.N.T.S. 247 (1957). 
241 Churchill & LaDuke, Radioactive Colonization and the Native American, 15(3) SOCIALIST REV. 
95, 110 (1985). 
242 See generally LEE, supra note 2. 
243 See II C. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMES: DIGEST/INDEX OF CONVENTIONS AND RELEVANT 
PENAL PROVISIONS (1985) for a listing of 22 Conventions concerning environmental protection. 
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States have in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the 
principles of international law ... responsibility to ensure that activities 
within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment 
of other states or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.244 
89 
Some scholars believe that the right to a clean environment should be added to the 
major human rights documents.245 Accordingly, many contemporary human rights doc-
uments contain provisions pertaining to the environment. For example, the Cocoyoc 
Declaration highlights the necessity to prevent environmental degradation.246 In addi-
tion, most human rights instruments protecting indigenous populations include provi-
sions on the population, safe technology, and wildlife conservation.247 Underlying the 
right to a clean environment, is the basic premise that indigenous people must have the 
right to develop as a group. Allowing a dominant nation to destroy the environment 
and land of indigenous peoples hardly contributes to their development as a people. In 
addition, thrusting Native Americans into an economic and social system incompatible 
with their traditional culture is not conducive to development.248 Native Americans' 
development has been smothered by commercial values and stagnated by their lack of 
meaningful participation'in the institutions which develop those values.249 
The right to development promotes collective self-reliance and requires that new 
social and economic institutions be formed that allow individuals to fully participate and 
reach their potential.250 Participation in such institutions abolish both old and new forms 
of domination.251 Essentially: 
[d]evelopment stands for the development of human beings and not for the 
development of countries, the production of things, their distribution, within 
social systems or the transformation of social structures. These may be means 
towards the end but they should not be confused with the end, which is that 
of developing the entire human being and human beings.252 
Thus, "human needs" development empowers Native Americans to participate in 
the formation of their society, to avoid political manipulation and the often re-occurring 
connection between coercive forces (U.S. government and values) and village residents 
244 48/14 U.N. Doc. AlConf. 21 (1972). 
24! W. GORMELY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL Co-
OPERATION (1976). 
246 Reprinted in 1 ALTERNATIVES 369 (1975). 
247 See, e.g., International Conferences of Indigenous Peoples, reprinted in Coba, supra note 160, 
at 148, 155. 
248 CLEMMER-SMITH, supra note 4. 
249 DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 18. 
250 Nanda, Development as an Emerging Human Right Under International Law, 13 DEN. J. INT'L L. 
POL. 161, 179 (1984). It is argued that the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) of 1934 was enacted 
in accordance with the concept of development. This idea is incorrect because the IRA is not a new 
institution created by oppressed persons, rather the IRA was established by outsiders who desired 
minimal feedback and suggestions. While the IRA has been partially successful in improving 
economic conditions on some reservations, the IRA has not spurred development because its scope 
has not promoted the social aspects of the tribe particularly the tribes' language, culture, and 
religion. See DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 18. 
251 Nanda, supra note 250. 
252 Develofnnmt, Environment and Technology - Towards a Technology for Self-Reliance, U.N. CON-
FERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT 3 (1979), 
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(Native Americans who participate in the Tribal Councils).255 The right to form one's 
own society implies the right to self-management of affairs which would increase au-
thentic participation by and impose true accountability on the Native Americans.254 The 
right to development requires participation in all phases of decision making255 because 
only the Native Americans understand and know how to fulfill their needs.256 The power 
to transcend an oppressive government or governmental decision is inherent in the right 
to develop.257 
Although the right to development is not explicitly contained in human rights 
documents that have achieved customary usage, it can be derived from a liberal inter-
pretation of those documents. The following provisions can be read to support the right 
of development: Articles 2, 4, 6-15 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights,258 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
Articles 4, 6_27.259 
Indigenous rights law is in the process of adopting many of the concepts implicit in 
the right to development. For example, the actions of the Inter-American Indian Con-
ferences emphasize the need to create institutions which would ensure the continuity of 
traditional ways, culture, language, and education.260 Other facets of developing indig-
enous rights law entitle indigenous nations and peoples to the permanent control and 
enjoyment of their aboriginal ancestral-historic territories. This includes surface and 
sub-surface rights, inland and coastal waters, renewable and non-renewable resources, 
and the economies based on these resources.261 
Although the international community,262 and internationallaw,265 has only recently 
recognized the difficulties facing indigenous populations, significant developments in 
indigenous rights law are evident in the creation of a special forum to hear complaints 
on violations of the human rights of indigenous people. In 1982 the U.N. Working 
Group on Indigenous Populations was established under the U.N. Commission on Hu-
man Rights and its Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities.2M This working group not only examines cases, but gives special attention to 
the growing body of recognized rights of indigenous populations.265 
In many respects Pub. L. No. 93-531 violates evolving indigenous law. For example, 
Article 8 of the Declaration of Principles on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples states "no 
state shall participate financially or militarily in the involuntary displacement of indige-
255 Paul & Dias, supra note 40, at I, 2. 
254 [d. at 3. 
205 /d. at 5. 
256 See generally, P. FREIRE, PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED (1968). The overgrazing problem in 
the jUA is used as evidence that traditionals are unable to satisfy their needs effectively. This claim 
is incorrect because problems in the jUA, such as overgrazing, occur not out of ignorance, but 
because of a lack of alternatives. Paul & Dias, supra note 40, at 6. 
257 Paul & Dias, supra note 40, at 13. 
258 Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 174. 
259 Civil and Political Rights, supra note 175. 
260 Coba, supra note 160, ~ ~ 38,42 at 143. 
261 See infra note 266, at art. 4. 
262 See THE RUSSEL TRIBUNAL ON THE RIGHTS OF THE INDIANS OF THE AMERICAS (1980). 
26. Coba, supra note 160, published in 1986, this paper was the first extensive compilation of 
international law on indigenous rights. 
264 jones, supra note 163, at 71. 
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nous populations. or in the subsequent economic exploitation or military use of their 
territory .... "266 Clearly, the U.S. government has involuntarily displaced the traditional 
Hopi and Navajo for the economic exploitation of their territory at Big Mountain. 
Thus, the ramifications of Pub. L. No. 93-531 involve substantial violations of 
international human rights law. In order to prevent the Big Mountain relocation man-
dated by Pub. L. No. 93-531, the Indians affected must bring a cause of action in a 
domestic or international forum. 267 
V. LIKEUHOOD OF A SUCCESSFUL CHALLENGE TO PUB. L. No. 93-531 UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAw 
A. Domestic Fora 
In many respects, international human rights law is ineffective except for its ability 
to sway international public opinion.26H Yet, member states of the U.N. are obligated by 
Article 56 of the U.N. Charter to "take joint and separate action to promote human 
rights and fundamental freedoms. "269 Based on this obligation many cases alleging 
human rights violations are brought in U.S. courts.270 
In domestic courts obtaining standing to sue has not been a major obstacle for 
Native Americans litigating human rights actions. In most jurisdictions, standing depends 
on whether an individual's or a group's rights have been violated, rather than on whether 
the person bringing suit officially represents the tribe.271 Nonetheless, traditional Native 
Americans have been denied standing to sue in some jurisdictions because they are not 
the official representatives of the tribe.272 
However, courts have avoided the issues regarding human rights violations through 
the political question doctrine. Under the political question doctrine courts will refuse 
to hear a cause of action which involves purely political questions because a decision by 
the judiciary would involve an encroachment on the legislative or executive power.275 
Since all judicial decisions redistribute political and economic power to some degree, 
invoking the political question doctrine to avoid hearing a case on the Big Mountain 
dispute or on issues of Indian sovereignty is irrational. 274 
The strongest argument to overcome the political question hurdle is simply that 
Native Americans are in need of immediate judicial assistance. It has been noted that: 
266 ElCN .4/Sub.2/1985IWP.41 Add.4. 
267 For an interesting analogy see Dugard, supra note 112, at 11, 28. 
268 Jones, supra note 163, at 70. 
269 U.N. CHARTER art. 56. 
270 See generally Bazyler, Litigating the International Law of HU71llJn Rights: A 'How to' ApprOQCh, 7 
WHITTIER L. REV. 713 (1985). 
271 See Nanda, International HU71IIJn Rights and International Criminal Law and Procedure: Judicial 
Remedies in U.S. Courts For Breaches of Internationally Protected HU71llJn Rights (1986) (available from 
the University of Denver International Legal Studies Program), the author believes that an increased 
awareness that all crimes/human rights violations are committed against humanity establishes the 
basis for universal jurisdiction. 
272 The Hopi Tribal Council is the official representative of the Hopi people. For examples of 
the attempted suits in the 1970's by the traditional Hopi against the federal government and the 
Hopi Tribal Council see Berkey, Coulter & Tullberg, supra note 42, at 163. 
27S BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1023 (5th ed. 1969). 
274 KRUPER, supra note 165, at 107. 
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The fact that conduct leading to collective victimization may have, in whole 
or in part, its origins in political question should not be a deterrent to the 
study of victimization impact and the protection of victims. It would be tragic 
if concern for "collective victims" should be overlooked because of political 
sensitivities or apprehensions that the study of the question could be politi-
cized.275 
Human rights issues raise political questions because: 
... human rights cases not only out of federal courts, but the state courts as 
well, by broad readings of the political question doctrine and other vaguely 
sketched notions of justiciability, indicates [an] awareness that the primary 
reason litigants invoke customary human rights law in the courts of the 
United States is precisely because the international norms are more generous 
than available domestic law. Unfortunately, the courts of the United States 
are less accustomed than they used to be to the interpretation and application 
of internationallaw.276 
However, any challenge by Native American nations to U.S. authority is generally 
challenged by the political question doctrine. The result is that U.S. courts have been 
unable to provide any redress for the claims asserted by Native American nations.277 
The Native American nations are caught in a "catch 22" designed by the U.S. govern-
ment. A commentator has stated: 
The United States cannot continue to subject Indian peoples to all the legal 
disadvantages of foreign nationhood [referring to the political question doc-
trine] and yet insist that Indian affairs are not a matter for international 
concern and that Indian nations are not subjects of internationallaw.278 
Judge Warren UrOOm, in his opinion concluding the 1974 Sioux Sovereignty Hearings, 
felt that any decision on Indian sovereignty would be a policy decision which he believed 
the judiciary did not have the authority to make.279 Although Judge UrOOm believed 
that U.S. relations with American Indians were rooted in international law and that the 
Sioux were once a fully sovereign nation, he did not believe he could undo a history of 
actions by the federal government without regard to the United States obligations under 
internationallaw.280 
The U.S. Constitution states that "all treaties made or which shall be made under 
the authority of the United States shall be the Supreme Law of the Land."281 Although 
275 Bassiouni, supra note 163, at 242. 
276 Hartman, Enforcement of International Human Rights Law in State and Federal Courts, 7 WHITTIER 
L. REv. 741, 750 (1985). 
277 For a detailed discussion of the effect of the political question doctrine on Native American 
group rights, see Coulter, The Denial of Legal Remedies to Indian Nations Under U.S. Law in RETHINKING 
INDIAN LAw 103 (1982). 
278Id. at 107. For example, the court determined that the traditional Hopi leaders could not 
sue the Hopi Tribal Council because it represented a sovereign state. As an IRA government, the 
Hopi Tribal Council is an extension of the U.S. government and therefore, has sovereign immunity. 
See Mander, supra note 11, at 59. 
279 Excerpts from the decision, reprinted in THE GREAT SIOUX NATION - SITTING IN JUDGMENT 
ON AMERICA supra note 148, at 198. 
28°Id. at 197, 198. 
28. U.S. CONST. art. VI, sec. 2. 
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the language of the Constitution plainly mandates the application of international law 
as it appears in treaties, courts have struggled to avoid that mandate when treaty 
obligations conflict with legislative or executive policy. One way courts have avoided this 
obligation is to make a distinction between self-executing treaties, those treaties clear 
enough to be invoked as binding rules of law in domestic courts, and non-self-executing 
treaties, those treaties which need additional domestic legislation before they can be 
invoked as binding rules of law in domestic courtS.282 Scholars believe that courts have 
been overzealous in their application of the non-self-executing treaty approach, which 
has resulted in an underzealous application of treaties containing protection of basic 
human rights and dignities.283 
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has declared: 
International law is part of our law and must be ascertained and administered 
by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of 
right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination.284 
The Supreme Court was referring to customary law, which is composed of the standards 
or recognized norms of international law which must be followed by every nation.285 
The application of customary human rights law in domestic courts has met with limited 
but perhaps growing success.286 The rationale posited for the lack of complete success 
in litigating human rights claims in domestic courts is the lack of understanding by 
members of the judiciary of their obligation to apply customary human rights law.287 
Once courts recognize their obligations, Native Americans may be able to sustain causes 
of actions based on violations of customary human rights law. Meanwhile, American 
Indians must seek other forums to litigate their actions. 
B. International Fora 
In the international fora, the basic standing requirements to sue vary depending on 
the procedure and the organization under which the claim is brought. The requirement 
that all domestic remedies must be exhausted before seeking relief at the international 
level is the only hurdle facing Native Americans in order to establish standing.288 How-
ever, the standing question is essentially moot because traditional Indians are generally 
unsuccessful in having their claims heard in domestic courts289 and have previously 
presented claims to international bodies.290 
Generally, Native Americans have brought their claims before human rights bodies 
ofthe U.N. and regional organizations. In order to bring a claim before the International 
Court of Justice (IC]), Native Americans must be found to have international personality. 
282 For a complete discussion, see Hartman, supra note 276. 
28. Id. 
284 Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). 
285 Customary international law is derived from public international law documents such as the 
U.N. Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, international conventions, compar-
ative law, judicial opinions, and the writings of scholars. See Bazyler, supra note 270. 
286 See generally Nanda, supra note 271; Hartman, supra note 276. 
287 See Nanda, supra note 271. 
288 Indian Law Resource Center, International Human Rights Procedures, in RETHINKING INDIAN 
LAW 133, 134 (1982). 
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However, the IC]'s jurisdiction is generally limited to cases between members of the 
United Nations.291 Thus, since only states can be members of the U.N., if Native Amer-
icans obtained standing to sue in the IC], the Court would implicitly recognize the 
nationhood of the tribes. Currently, the IC] is unwilling to recognize the nationhood of 
American Indians, particularly when granting international personality to a group would 
have political ramifications for a member nation.292 Thus, while the political question 
doctrine does not operate at the international level, political considerations are a subtle, 
yet coercive force. 293 Although it is unrealistic to think that human rights law can exist 
in a political vacuum, the IC] must transcend the limiting western doctrine of interna-
tional personality before there can be effective human rights protection at the interna-
tional level.294 
Since international organizations are not bound by the international personality 
doctrine, Native Americans' claims are met at international organizations with greater 
success than at the IC]. However, even in international organizations, claims by Native 
Americans have had limited success. The United Nations Commission on Human Rights 
has limited effectiveness because of two resolutions passed by the Economic and Social 
Council.295 Resolution 1235 gave the U.N. Commission on Human Rights authority to 
make thorough studies of situations which reveal a consistent pattern of human rights 
violations.296 Resolution 1503 establishes the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrim-
ination which is designed to redress those human rights violations which reveal a con-
sistent pattern of gross and reliably documented violations of human rights and fun-
damental freedoms.297 These two resolutions combined with resolution 1296298 complete 
the basis on which a complaint may be brought before the Commission.299 
The Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination has created special working 
groups in order to more effectively implement human rights law.30o For example, in 
1981, the Sub-Commission created a Working Group on Indigenous Populations301 which 
meets prior to the annual Sub-Commission meeting with the purpose of developing 
international standards for the promotion and protection of human rights of indigenous 
peoples.302 Thus far, the U.N. mechanisms for the implementation of human rights law 
291 U.N. CHARTER art. 93(1) states: "[a]1I members of the United Nations are ipso facto parties 
to the Statute of the International Court of Justice." Article 93(2) provides for the admission to the 
Court of a state which is not a member of the United Nations: "A state which is not a member of 
the United Nations may become a party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice on 
conditions to be determined in each case by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of 
the Security Council." 
292 R. FALK, REVIVING THE WORLD COURT (1986). 
293 See generally KRUPER, supra note 165. 
294Id. at 107, 108. 
295Id. at 106. 
296 E.S.C. Res. 1235, U.N. Doc. E/4393 (1967). 
297 E.S.C. Res. 1503, U.N. Doc. AC. 7/SR. 637 (1970). 
298 The Commission may consider a written statement of no more than 2,000 words submitted 
by a non-governmental organization having consultative status with the U.N. See Indian Law 
Resource Center, supra note 288, at 135. See also Tardu, United Nations Responses to Gross Violations 
of Human Rights: The 1503 Procedure, 20 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 559 (1980). 
299 For a complete discussion on the procedures for bringing an action before the Commission 
see Indian Law Resource Center, supra note 288, at 134. 
300Id. 
301 Ryan, supra note 120, at 175. 
302 U.N. Doc. ElCnAISub.2/495. 
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have performed poorly mainly due to political gamesmanship.303 However, optimism 
prevails and an overall improvement in the effectiveness of the U.N. mechanisms may 
be forthcoming. 304 
Beyond U.N. organizations Native Americans have sought relief in the Organization 
of American States (OAS). Currently it is difficult to perceive how Native Americans 
could bring a viable cause of action against the United States in the Organization of 
American States. The OAS, however, is beginning to use the new mechanisms and 
procedures which appear in the American Convention on Human Rights.305 Currently, 
these procedures are being implemented through the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.306 Interaction between 
the U.S. and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights is well-established.307 
In 1977, the U.S. was instrumental in reactivating the Commission's effectiveness by 
announcing that the U.S. would allow the Commission free access to its territory for on-
site investigations at the Commission's discretion.308 Thus, to obtain standing in OAS 
Native Americans should petition the Commission to investigate the Big Mountain 
situation for alleged violations of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of 
Man.309 However, petitioning the Commission to investigate does not ensure that the 
Commission will grant the petition and report human rights violations.310 
Law exists that can stop the Big Mountain relocation. The question is simply whether 
the law, if applied, will be effective. Generally, international mechanisms are ineffective 
and no state is willing to represent the Indians at Big Mountain before the IC]. Although 
actions in the international arena may not be able to stop the Big Mountain relocation, 
these actions are important because they influence international public opinion, which 
has a corresponding impact on Congress. Furthermore, these actions establish the path 
the judiciary should follow in causes of action based on international human rights law. 
VI. POLICY SUGGESTIONS 
The situation at Big Mountain is a result of 200 years of misguided U.S. Indian 
policy. A new policy dealing specifically with the Big Mountain dispute would be inad-
equate. While the removal of traditional Native Americans from Big Mountain must be 
stopped, repeal of Pub. L. No. 93-531 will not suffice as a solution to the problems 
inherent in U.S. Indian policy. 
The traditional Indians want to live according to their laws, not those imposed upon 
them by the United States. Those Indians who have assimilated into contemporary society 
should not be allowed to take advantage of the resources owed to the tribe as a whole 
and entrusted to the tribe for future generations. In both domestic and international 
303 KRUPER, supra note 165, at 107. 
304Id. 
305 Norris, Bringing Human Rights Petitions Before the Inter-American Commission, 20 SANTA CLARA 
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306 Nanda, Implementation of Human Rights by the United Nations and Regional Organizations, 21 DE 
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310 For more information on the OAS and its procedures see Norris, supra notes 305, 308. 
96 BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 7:61 
fora, Native American tribes must be recognized as sovereign nations. Indian sovereignty 
is an expression of the traditional Indian community and should be respected. Recog-
nition of Native American sovereignty is essential because the human rights violations 
incurred in the Big Mountain relocation are related to the fact that the institutions 
controlling Native Americans have been imposed upon them. They must be allowed to 
regain control over the institutions that most affect their lives. 
In many respects, Pub. L. No. 93-531 is a result of alien values thrust upon Native 
Americans. The traditional life styles of the Native Americans have been decimated by 
the policies of the United States government. It is naive to believe that life can return 
to how it was 300 years ago. It is not naive to believe that if the traditional Native 
Americans were given control of their futures, they could build an admirable society. 
As long as the United States continues to ignore human rights law to the detriment 
of the traditional Indians, the United States sacrifices its honor and dignity.3Il In some 
respects, the Big Mountain relocation exemplifies the oppression of a movement which 
is on the cutting edge of social progress because the movement to protect traditional 
ways questions contemporary values and exposes the suicidal aspects of our society.312 
The quality of political life in the United States, as represented by our respect for 
human rights and dignities has shaped the respect for human rights throughout the 
world.313 Unfortunately most people do not understand that everyone's actions affect, 
change and create contemporary society. It is for this reason that everyone must partic-
ipate in and understand the long-term ramifications of our decisions. That is the lesson 
to be learned from the degrading and insensitive treatment of traditional Native Amer-
ICans. 
311 Churchill, supra note 19, at 24. 
312 Krauss, supra note 177, at 442,449. 
313 C. BAY, STRATEGIES OF POLITICAL EMANCIPATION 41 (1981). 
